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Abstract
In 1962, Gale and Shapley [15] introduced a matching problem between two sets of agents
M and W (men/women, students/universities, doctors/hospitals), who need to be matched by
taking into account that each agent on one side of the market has an exogenous preference order
over the agents of the other side. They defined a matching as stable if no unmatched pair can
Pareto improve by matching together. They proved the existence of a stable matching using
a ”deferred-acceptance” algorithm. Shapley and Shubik [27] extended the model by allowing
monetary transfers (buyers/sellers, workers/firms). Our article offers a further extension by
assuming that matched couples obtain their payoff endogenously as the outcome of a strategic-
form game they have to play. A matching, together with a strategy profile, is externally stable
if no unmatched pair can form a couple and play a strategy profile in their game that Pareto
improves their previous payoffs. It is internally stable if no agent, by individually changing
his/her strategy inside his/her couple, can increase his/her payoff without breaking the external
stability of his/her couple (e.g. the partner’s payoff decreases below his/her current market
outside option). By combining a deferred acceptance algorithm with a new algorithm, we
prove the existence of externally and internally stable matchings when couples play strictly
competitive games, potential games, or infinitely repeated games. Our model encompasses and
refines matching with monetary transfers [10, 11, 18, 27] as well as matching with contracts
(Blaire [7], Milgrom and Hatfield [17]).
1 Introduction
The Gale and Shapley [15] two-sided market matching problem consists in finding a “stable” as-
signment between two different sets of agents M and W given that each agent on one side has an
exogenous preference ordering over the agents of the other side.
The marriage problem focuses on a coupling µ that associates an agent m ∈M to at most one
agent w ∈ W . The coupling µ is stable if no uncoupled pair of agents (m,w) ∈ M ×W , both
prefer to be matched rather than staying with their partners in µ. Gale and Shapley [15] used a
“propose-dispose,” also called “deferred-acceptance,” algorithm to prove the existence of a stable
matching for every instance. Roth and Vande Vate [26] studied a random process to find a stable
matching from some arbitrary matching. Ma [20] proved that the Roth and Vande Vate algorithm
does not find all the stable matchings. Recently, Dworczak [13] introduced a new class of algorithms
called deferred acceptance with compensation chains algorithms (DACC)1 in which both sides of
the market can make offers in an arbitrary pre-determined order and proved that a matching is
stable if and only if it is the outcome of some DACC algorithm.
Gale and Sotomayor [16, 25] proved a lattice structure over the set of stable matchings (briefly
mentioned in Gale and Shapley [15]) and showed that the algorithm in which men are proposing
and women are disposing converges to the best stable matching for men.
Balinski and Ratier [5] proposed an elegant directed graph approach to the stable marriage
problem and characterized the stable matching polytope in the one-to-one setting through linear
inequalities, proving that any feasible point of the polytope is a stable matching and vice versa.
1A related class of algorithms was introduced by McVitie and Wilson [21] in 1971.
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Ba¨ıou and Balinski continued the approach and characterized in [4] the polytope of stable matching
in the one-to-many problem.
Shapley and Shubik [27] extended the model by allowing monetary transfers. The leading
example is a housing market where buyers and sellers have quasi-linear utilities. Buyers i ∈ I have
different evaluations ((vi,j)i∈I,j∈J) for the houses and sellers j ∈ J have different costs ((cj)j∈J)
over their houses. Each seller j ∈ J is willing to sell his/her house at some price pj ≥ cj , and
each buyer i ∈ I is interested in buying a house to j at a certain price pi,j ≤ vi,j. An allocation is
a pair (µ, p) with µ a matching between sellers and buyers, and p = (pi)i∈I a vector of monetary
transfers where pi is the price offered by i ∈ I to µ(i) ∈ J . It is stable if there are no unmatched
pair (i, j) and no transaction price q from i to j such that both agents increase their payoff by
trading at price q. Gale and Demange [10] considered more general utility functions for buyers and
sellers (non quasi-linear), allowed monetary transfers on both sides (from buyer to seller and vice-
versa), and proved that the set of stable allocations has a lattice structure2. Hatfield and Milgrom
[17], extended the Gale-Demange model to a one-to-many setting and, by allowing couples to sign
binding contracts. Under monotonicity assumptions allowing the use of Tarski’s fixed theorem, they
proved that the set of stable allocations is a non-empty lattice. A pioneer article in the extension
of Gale-Shapley’s model to a many-to-many setting was made by Blaire [7] in 1988, studying the
case in which workers and firms must form partnerships (workers can works in several firms at the
same time), and to agree salaries to be paid by the jobs done. Although not very mentioned, [7] is
one of the first article in studying the lattice structure of the set of stable allocations with salaries,
also extending [18] and [19].
Our paper proposes to go further on the extension by supposing that members of a couple
(i, j) ∈ M ×W obtain their payoffs as the output of a strategic game Gi,j = (Xi, Yj, Ui,j , Vi,j),
that they have to play, where Xi is i’s action/strategy set, Yj is j’s action/strategy set, and
Ui,j, Vi,j : Xi×Yj → R are the utility functions of i and j, respectively. Hence, if man i and women
j are married and if i chooses to play xi and j chooses to play yj, i’s final utility is Ui,j(xi, yj) and
j’s final utility is Vi,j(xi, yj).
An outcome of the matching game, named a matching profile, is a triple (µ, x, y) with µ a
matching between M and W , x = (xi)i∈M ∈
∏
i∈M Xi a men’s strategy profile and y = (yj)j∈W ∈∏
j∈W Yj a women’s strategy profile.
Our model is motivated from real life. When two people form a couple, usually there is no
monetary transfer, no binding contract but actions are freely and independently chosen in everyday
life (who takes the kids to the school, to share the house expenses, sharing more or less time together,
etc). The optimal action of a person in the couple depends on his/her partner’s action, but also
on his/her market outside option (how easy is to find another partner or the personal valuation
for being single). The same happens between a worker and a firm, a student and a PhD advisor,
etc. Thus, on top of the “external” stability requirement of Gale-Shapley, an “internal” stability
condition a` la Nash equilibrium appears. We formulate the condition and prove, algorithmically,
the existence of externally and internally stables matchings, whenever the games Gi,j , i ∈M, j ∈W
satisfy a feasibility condition.
To be more precise, a matching profile (µ, x, y) is called externally stable if no pair of unmatched
agents (i′, j′) can jointly deviate to some strategy profile (x′i′ , y
′
j′) in their game Gi′,j′ that Pareto
improves their payoffs. This is a natural extension of Gale-Shapley pairwise stability. A “propose-
dispose” algorithm allows us to prove that, if all the strategic games Gi,j , (i, j) ∈ M ×W , have
compact strategy spaces and continuous payoff functions, the matching game admits an externally
stable matching profile. We prove that a semi-lattice structure holds: namely that the maximum
2Non-emptiness of this set has been proved in [9, 24]
between two externally stable matching profiles with respect to men’s preferences (resp. women’s
preferences) is externally stable. This implies that our algorithm in which men are proposing
converges to the best externally stable matching for men. Interestingly, when all the strategic
games Gi,j , (i, j) ∈M ×W are zero-sum games (or more generally, are strictly competitive games),
then the max operation with respect to men’s preferences is equivalent to the min operation with
respect to women’s preferences and vice-versa. This allows us to recover the usual lattice structure,
extending Gale-Shapley’s, as well as Shapley-Shubik’s and Gale-Demange’s models, as both are
particular instances of our model where Gi,j , (i, j) ∈M ×W are strictly competitive games.
A matching profile (µ, x, y) is internally stable if no player has a profitable deviation that pre-
serves the stability of his/her couple (i.e. either no player has profitable deviations or any profitable
deviation decreases the partner’s payoff below his/her market outside option). To understand this
new constrained Nash equilibrium condition, suppose there is only one single men i in M and only
one single woman j in W . They can match and play a strategic game Gi,j or remain single. Let
xi be the action chosen by i and yj the action chosen by j if they match and play their game.
Suppose that the utility of being single for i is ui and for j is vj. If Ui,j(xi, yj) < ui, then the
marriage is externally unstable because i prefers to break the couple and stay single. Similarly, if
Vi,j(xi, yj) < vj, j prefers to break the couple and stay single. Let us assume that Ui,j(xi, yj) ≥ ui,
Vi,j(xi, yj) ≥ vj and that i has a profitable deviation x
′
i ∈ Xi (i.e. Ui,j(x
′
i, yj) > Ui,j(xi, yj)). If j’s
utility remains above her outside option (i.e. Vi,j(x
′
i, yj) ≥ vj), then (xi, yj) is internally unstable
because i can deviate to x′i and increase his payoff without breaking the stability of the couple.
Our paper defines a class of strategic games (called feasible games) which admit constrained
Nash equilibria for any pair of feasible outside options. This class is proven to include zero-sum
games, strictly competitive games, potential games, and some dynamic games such as infinitely
repeated games, and perfect information games. We also prove that: (a) when all games Gi,j ,
(i, j) ∈ M ×W are feasible, a new algorithm, if it converges, reaches an externally and internally
stable matching profile and (2) the algorithm converges when all games Gi,j, (i, j) ∈ M ×W are
zero-sum, strictly competitive, potential or infinitely repeated.
Since strictly competitive games are feasible, we recover and refine Shapley-Shubik and Gale-
Demange results. There are different ways of associating a strategic game to a Shapley-Shubik’s
[27] or a Gale-Demange’s [10] model. Externally stable equilibria in any of those matching games
will coincide with pairwise stable allocations in Shapley-Shubik or Gale-Demange, but different
game models induce different selections among the stable outcomes. For example, suppose that in
the Shapley and Shubik’s model, there is only one seller and one buyer, the seller has cost c for the
house and the buyer a value v. If v < c, there is no possibility of trade. Otherwise, the surplus v−c
is positive and any price p between c and v correspond to an externally stable matching. If the
strategic interaction between the buyer and the seller is an ultimatum bargaining game [1] where
the seller is the first proposer (resp. the seller is the first proposer), the externally and internally
stable selected outcome is p = v (resp. p = c). On the other hand, if the strategic interaction is
modeled by the Rubinstein alternating offers bargaining game [23] with equally patient players, the
externally and internally stable outcome is the Nash bargaining solution p = (v − c)/2. Therefore,
different games induce different surpluses.3
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and the notions of external
and internal stability. Section 3 proves that when all players play the same game, external and
internal stabilities force all couples (except one) to the same Pareto optimal payoff. In Section 4, a
“deferred-acceptance” algorithm proves the existence of externally stable matchings whenever all
3Matching with contract of Hatfield and Milgrom [17] can also be mapped to our model (see appendix). Again,
there are many choices of strategic games whose externally stable matching coincide with the Hatfield-Milgrom stable
allocation, and varying the game varies the surplus sharing.
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games Gi,j , (i, j) ∈ M ×W , are compact-continuous games. We also discuss the complexity of
the algorithm, prove a semi-lattice structure over the set of external stable matchings and deduce
the usual lattice structure when all games are strictly competitive. Finally, we show that Shapley-
Shubik and Gale-Demange are particular instances of our model. In Section 5, we define the class of
feasible games4, and prove that when all games are feasible, a second algorithm (when it converges)
allows us to obtain an externally and internally stable matching profile starting from any externally
stable matching profile. While there are finite two-player static games in mixed strategies that are
not feasible, we prove that a large class of games is feasible, including zero-sum games, strictly
competitive games, potential games and infinitely repeated games. Moreover, we prove that our
second algorithm converges in all the classes of games listed above. Section 6 discusses some
extensions and concludes the paper. The appendix contains additional results such as the link with
Hatfield and Milgrom [17] model and the missing proofs.
2 Model and Stability Notions
2.1 Model and definition of a matching profile
Along the paper, we consider two finite set of agents M andW that we refer to as men and women,
respectively. The cardinals ofM andW are denoted |M | and |W | respectively, and typical elements
are denoted i ∈M and j ∈W .
Definition 2.1. A matching µ is a mapping between M and W where each agent on one side is
matched to at most one agent on the other side. If i ∈ M and j ∈ W are matched in µ, we will
denote indistinctly j = µi or i = µj.
When a couple (i, j) ∈ M ×W forms, they get their payoffs as the output of a strategic game
Gi,j := (Xi, Yj, Ui,j , Vi,j), where Xi, Yj are the strategy sets of man i and woman j, respectively
and Ui,j, Vi,j : Xi×Yj → R are their payoff functions. Denote by X :=
∏
i∈M Xi and Y :=
∏
i∈W Yi
the space of strategy profiles.5
Definition 2.2. Amen action profile (resp. women action profile) is a vector x = (x1, ..., x|M |)
∈ X (resp. y = (y1, ..., y|W |) ∈ Y ), with xi ∈ Xi (resp. yj ∈ Yj). A matching profile is a triple
pi = (µ, x, y) in which µ is a matching, x is a men action profile and y is a women action profile.
Given a matching profile pi = (µ, x, y), the players utilities are defined by ui(pi) := Ui,µi(xi, yµi),
∀i ∈M , vj(pi) := Vµj ,j(xµj , yj),∀j ∈W , as basically, the payoff obtained in the game played against
the partners.
As M and W may have different sizes, some agents may remain single. It is then natural, to
suppose that a single agent will attribute a utility to being single, and it is also natural, to suppose
that this utility corresponds to him/her individually rational payoff (IRP): agents accept a partner
only if the payoff of their game is at least their IRP.
Formally, each man i ∈ M (resp. j ∈ W ) will be attributed a value ui ∈ R (resp. vj ∈ R),
which constitutes the utility of being single or his (resp. her) individually rational payoff.
4A two-player game is called feasible if, for any pair of outside options such that there is a strategy profile that
gives both players more that their outside options, there is a constrained Nash equilibrium with respect to those
outside options.
5Further assumptions (such as compactness and continuity) over the strategy sets and payoff functions will be
specified later.
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2.2 External and Internal Stability
Our first notion of stability is a natural extension of Gale-Shapley’s pairwise stability, in a rather
strong sense.
Definition 2.3. A matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) is externally stable (or pairwise stable) if,
(1) For any i ∈M and j ∈W , ui(pi) ≥ ui and vj(pi) ≥ vj,
(2) There is no (i, j) ∈M×W , not matched by µ, and no (si, tj) ∈ Xi×Yj such that Ui,j(si, tj) >
ui(pi) and Vi,j(si, tj) > vj(pi).
If a matching profile satisfies definition 2.3, (1) no matched agent wants to deviate breaking
his/her couple and becoming single, and (2) there is no unmatched pair (i, j) that can form a
couple, jointly deviate in actions and strictly increase their payoffs.6
External stability prevents any uncoupled agents from blocking the matching. The next notions
prevent profitable internal deviations, those that may occur inside a matched couple.
Definition 2.4. A matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) is Nash stable if for any couple (i, j) matched
by µ, (xi, yj) is a Nash equilibrium of Gi,j.
As will be seen in the next section, Nash stability is too demanding. Internal stability is a
very natural relaxation that will restore existence. If a matching profile is internally stable, and
if a player has a profitable deviation in his/her game, he/she will not deviate because the partner
would prefer to break the couple (the partner has a better credible outside option).
Definition 2.5. An externally stable matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) is internally stable if for any
couple (i, j) matched by µ and any (si, ti) ∈ Xi × Yj it holds,
(a) If Ui,j(si, yi) > ui(pi) then (µ, x/si, y) is not externally stable.
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(b) If Vi,j(xi, ti) > vj(pi) then (µ, x, y/ti) is not externally stable.
8
When a matching profile is externally and internally stable, it will be called stable.
3 Playing a Fixed Game
In this section, and to keep things simple and pedagogical, we suppose that M and W have the
same size, that all couples play the same game, and that all agents have very low utilities of being
single, so that they prefer to be matched rather than being single.
We first show that combining external stability and Nash stability is too demanding: existence
fails in all games where Nash equilibria are Pareto dominated. Next we show that replacing Nash
stability with internal stability restores existence in a large class of games.
Formally, we suppose that Ui,j = U , Vi,j = V , Xi = S, Yj = T , for any couple (i, j) ∈M ×W ,
meaning that the game played in every couple is independent from the identities of the players.
Denote by G a two-player game with action sets S and T and payoff functions U and V .
Proposition 3.1. If all Nash equilibria of G are Pareto-dominated, there are no matching profiles
that are externally stables and Nash stables.
6Some weaker notions of external stability are discussed in the appendix.
7where x/si is the profile obtained from x by replacing xi by si.
8where y/ti is the profile obtained from y by replacing yj by tj .
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Proof. Let pi = (µ, x, y) be a matching profile and (i1, j1), (i2, j2) be two couples matched by µ.
Nash stability implies that both couples play Nash equilibria of G, (x1, y1) and (x2, y2) respectively.
Without loss of generality, suppose that U(x1, y2) ≤ U(x2, y2). Let (x
∗
2, y
∗
2) be a strategy profile
that Pareto dominates (x2, y2): U(x2, y2) < U(x
∗
2, y
∗
2) and V (x2, y2) < V (x
∗
2, y
∗
2). Then, (i1, j2) is
a blocking pair: if man i1 is paired with women j2, both strictly increase their payoffs by playing
the strategy profile (x∗2, y
∗
2). This contradicts the external stability of pi.
Theorem 3.1 replaces Nash stability in proposition 3.1 by internal stability. Due to this, it is
possible to restore existence in a large class of games. Moreover, in stable matching profiles, almost
all players share the same Pareto-optimal payoff.
In the next theorem, we suppose that S and T are convex sets and that U and V are con-
tinuous and own-payoff q-concave.9 Observe that if s → U(s, t) is concave, linear or strictly
quasi-concave, then, it is q-concave, and so we cover the class of finite games in mixed strategies.
Also, note that q-concavity implies quasi-concavity.
Theorem 3.1. Let (s, t) be Pareto-optimal in G. Let µ be any matching and suppose that any
matched couple (i, j) in µ plays (xi, yj) = (s, t). Then, (µ, s, t) is (externally and internally) stable.
Conversely, if pi = (µ, x, y) is (externally and internally) stable, then any matched couple, except at
most one, plays Pareto-optimally in its game. If moreover the game satisfies condition (∗) below,
then all matched couples, except at most one, share the same Pareto-optimal payoff.
A game G satisfies property (∗) if for any pair of Pareto-optimal payoffs (u1, v1), (u2, v2)
such that u1<u2 and v2<v1, there exists a Pareto-optimal strategy profile (s
′, t′) such that
u1<U(s
′, t′)<u2 and v2<V (s
′, t′)<v1. Expressed differently, the Pareto frontier allows us to
continuously transfer utility from one player to the other, which is the case in many games.
Proof Theorem 3.1. Let (s, t) be Pareto-optimal in G and suppose that any matched couple (i, j)
in µ plays (xi, yi) = (s, t). It is not possible to find a blocking pair since any deviation from
(s, t) reduces the payoff of one of the agents of the blocking pair. Therefore, the matching profile
is externally stable. Regarding internal stability, consider an arbitrary matched couple (i, j) and
suppose that player i has a profitable deviation s′ in G. In particular, j’s payoff strictly decreases
when i deviates. Because of continuity, there is α ∈ (0, 1) such that V (s′, t) < V (αs+(1−α)s′, t) <
V (s, t). Because of q-concavity, U(αs+(1−α)s′, t) > U(s, t). Consequently, any i′ not married with
j increases his payoff as well as j’s payoff by forming a couple and playing (αs+(1−α)s′, t). Thus,
the deviation of player i creates the blocking pair (i′, j), breaking external stability. Therefore, the
matching profile is internally stable.
Conversely, consider two matched couples (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) with payoffs (u1, v1) and (u2, v2).
The objective is to show that either (u1, v1) or (u2, v2) are Pareto-optimal payoffs. Suppose for
example that u1 ≤ u2. If (u2, v2) is Pareto-dominated, i1 can replace i2 by proposing to j2 a Pareto-
optimal improvement, so the pair (i1, j2) externally blocks the matching profile. A contradiction,
thus (u2, v2) is Pareto optimal. As a conclusion, all couples, except perhaps one, are playing
Pareto-optimal in their game.
Finally, suppose the game satisfies property (∗) and that couples 1 and 2 are playing Pareto
optimally but their payoffs differ. Without loss of generality, suppose that u1 = U(x1, y1) <
U(x2, y2) = u2. Then, v1 = V (x1, y1) > V (x2, y2) = v2. By condition (∗), there exists a Pareto-
optimal strategy profile (s′, t′) such that u2 > U(s
′, t′) > u1 and v1 > V (s
′, t′) > v2. Thus, (i1, j2)
9A function f is q-concave if for any (s, s′, u), such that f(s) ≥ u and f(s′) > u, then, f(s′′) > u, for any s′′ ∈]s, s′[.
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is a blocking pair of pi, a contradiction. Consequently, all couples, except perhaps one, share the
same Pareto-optimal payoff.
Hence, stability has the feature to induce cooperation (e.g. Pareto optimality) but also some
uniformity in behaviors (couples share the same payoffs).
Another known cooperation mechanism is repetition: cooperation becomes sustainable because
of a punishment threat: if you deviate from cooperation today, I will punish you tomorrow. In
our matching model, cooperation occurs because of an outside option threat: if you deviate from
cooperation in our couple, I will break our couple and switch for a better outside option. Note
that when two player plays infinitely the same game, there are two many Nash equilibrium payoffs
(any feasible and individually rational payoff) not all are Pareto-optimal. In our model, when all
players play the same game, only Pareto-optimal payoffs are stable.
The following sections study the general case in which couples can play different games. Section
4 designs an algorithm to compute externally stable matching profiles for practically any family
of strategic games (Gi,j)i∈M,j∈W . In particular, when all strategic games are strictly competitive,
we recover some classical results such as Gale-Shapley’s lattice structure. Section 5 gives necessary
and sufficient conditions on the strategic games for existence and computation of (externally and
internally) stable matching profiles, that are satisfied, for example, by strictly competitive games,
potential games and infinitely repeated games.
4 Playing Different Games: External Stability
In Gale-Shapley’s spirit, we design a propose-dispose algorithm to prove the existence of externally
stable matching profiles when couples play potentially different games (Gi,j)i∈M,j∈W , over compact
strategy sets Xi and Yj and continuous payoff functions Ui,j : Xi × Yj → R, Vi,j : Xi × Yj → R.
10
We then study the complexity of this algorithm, prove a semi-lattice structure over the set of
externally stable matchings and, deduce the classical lattice structure when all games Gi,j are
strictly competitive. Finally, we prove that Shapley-Shubik’s and Gale-Demange’s model can be
mapped into matching games.
4.1 Propose-dispose Algorithm
To simplify the subsequent analysis, we enlarge our set of players by adding two new players i0 and
j0, called the empty players, that obey the following rules: (1) they can be matched with more
than one player, (2) any man i ∈M matching with j0 (resp. woman matching i0) receives ui (resp.
vj), (3) during our propose-dispose algorithm (described below), an empty player will accept any
person who wants to be with him/her, (4) empty-players cannot be matched between them.
For each ε > 0 (small, and fixed), the propose-dispose algorithm is proven to converge to a
complete matching. In each step, a man proposes to the woman he prefers the most (possible j0)
a “contract” consisting in a pair of strategies (x, y) ∈ Xi × Yj to be played in their common game.
Proposed contracts should maximize men’s payoff, but to be acceptable, they must also guarantee
to women at least their current payoff. Formally, consider a vector v := (vj)j∈W ∈ R
|W |, with vj
being j’s current payoff. A contract (xi, yj) between i and j is attractive for j if Vi,j(xi, yj) ≥ vj+ε.
10When utilities are discontinuous and/or strategy sets are not compact, our propose-dispose algorithm, applied
to a monotonic uniformly continuous transformation f(Ui,j) and f(Vi,j) that bounds all utility functions, shows
existence of ε-externally stable matchings. Continuity and compactness are needed technically to go to the limit.
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Thus, a proposer man i ∈M starts by solving the following optimization problem,
(Pi(v)) max
x∈Xi,y∈Yj ,j∈W∪{j0}
{Ui,j(x, y) : Vi,j(x, y) ≥ vj + ε}
The problem Pi is always feasible as any man can always match with j0. Initially, all women
start matched with the empty man i0, receiving a payoff equal to vj ,∀j ∈ W , except for j0 who
starts single and always receives a payoff of vj0 = −∞. Since the empty man cannot offer to his
partners a higher payoff, any first proposal received by a woman is automatically accepted.
A woman may stop being the best option for a man if she asks for a payoff too high. During the
propose-dispose algorithm, women increase their payoff and therefore, men’s feasible regions shrink.
Thus, the optimal solutions of men’s optimization problems change and then, unlike Gale-Shapley’s
algorithm, the orders in which men rank women change along iterations.
When a man proposes to a woman j matched with someone different from i0, the current partner
and the proposer compete to see who gives her the most attractive contract. Given a man i, let j2
be the second best option for him (possibly j0) and (x
′, y′) the best (for i) attractive contract he
can offer to her. Setting βi := Ui,j2(x
′, y′) we define the optimization problem (Pmaxi,j (βi)) of finding
the highest payoff that i can propose to j, such that his payoff is never below βi,
(Pmaxi,j (βi)) max
x∈Xi,y∈Yj ,λ∈R
{λ : Vi,j(x, y) = λ,Ui,j(x, y)>βi}
The solution to (Pmaxi,j (β)) corresponds to the maximum value λ that i is willing to offer (through
some contract) to j. Any higher value λ+ will change i’s mind and will make him prefer to propose
to j2.
In a competition, the proposer i and the partner i′, compute the maximum values they are
willing to offer λi, λi′ respectively. Then, the woman j chooses the man who proposes the highest
value (in case of draw the winner is the current partner). Once the winner chosen, he decreases his
offer until matching the one of the loser. In other words, the outcome of the competition between
the men is analog to what one would obtain by a “second price auction” in which men would be
the bidders. Formally, if i beats i′, i solves the problem,
(P newi,j (λi′)) max
x∈Xi,y∈Yj
{Ui,j(x, y) : Vi,j(x, y) ≥ λi′}
Remark 4.1. A defeated man i will not propose right away to the same woman. Indeed, offering to
her an attractive contract implies increasing her new payoff by at least ε, which is not in his interest.
This step, although simple, is crucial for obtaining the convergence of algorithm 1. However, the
final solution does not correspond to an exact externally stable matching, but only a ε-approximation.
In the stable matching literature, all authors [11, 17, 18] have recurred to the same technique at
the moment of designing an algorithm for computing stable allocation. The problem of computing
a 0-stable allocation for endogenous preferences remains still open.
Remark 4.2. The continuity of the payoff functions and the compactness of the strategy sets
guarantee the existence of solutions for all optimization problems.11
Algorithm 1 summarizes the propose-dispose dynamic just explained. The rest of the section is
dedicated to prove that algorithm 1 ends in finite time and its output corresponds to a matching
profile ε-externally stable (definition 4.1). In order to do it, several propositions are presented.
Some proofs are included in the appendix.
11On the other hand, when utilities are discontinuous or strategy sets are not compact, one can select a ε-optimal
strategy, which always exists.
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Algorithm 1: Propose-dispose Algorithm
1 Initialize M ′ ←M ; vj ← vj ,∀j ∈W ; ui0 , vj0 ← −∞, µ← ∅
2 while M ′ 6= ∅ do
3 Choose i ∈M ′ and solve the problem Pi(v). Let (j, x, y) be a solution. If j = j0, then
µi ← j0, M
′ ←M ′ − {i} and repeat step 3.
4 if µj = i0 then
5 i is automatically accepted: µi ← j, µj ← i, vi ← Vi,j(x, y), M
′ ←M ′ − {i}
6 if µj = i
′ then
7 i and i′ compete for j: Let βi := Ui,j2(x2, y2), βi′ := Ui′,j′2(x
′
2, y
′
2) be the best payoff
that i and i′ can get with their second most preferred partner. Let
λi := val(P
max
i,j (βi)), λi′ := val(P
max
i′,j (βi′))
8 if λi>λi′ then
9 i replaces to i′: µi ← j, µi′ ← ∅, µj ← i, M
′ ←M ′ − {i}+ {i′}. Let (x, y) be the
solution to (P newi,j (λi′)). Then, vj ← Vi,j(x, y). Go back to step 3 with i
′
proposing next
10 else
11 i is rejected: Let (x, y) be the solution to (P newi′,j (λi)). Then, vj ← Vi′,j(x, y). Go
back to step 3 with i proposing again
Proposition 4.1. Let i be a man proposing to a woman j. Let λ := val((Pmaxi,j (u
2
i ))) with u
2
i the
highest payoff that i can get with his second most preferred woman. Let vj be the current payoff of
j. Then, it holds that λ ≥ vj + ε.
Proposition 4.1 states that, in a competition, the proposer always offers an improvement of at
least ε to j. The case of the partner of j is slightly more complex. Indeed, if i is matched with j
and she gets proposed, the optimization problem (Pmaxi,j (βi)) only makes sense if j is still i’s optimal
choice. Due to possible previous competitions, it may happen that at the moment of the proposal,
man i is already making the worst contract he is willing to do. Thus, any improvement on j’s payoff
changes i’s mind who prefers to quit the couple. This can be easily checked by solving (Pi(v)) and
checking if j is still the solution. If it does, both men can compete without problem. If not, the new
proposer wins with the first contract he has proposed. We say that i is automatically replaced.
In the first case, proposition 4.1 also holds for i. In the second one, there is no need for recomputing
the contract as the couple keeps the one first offered by the proposer.
Proposition 4.2. The winner of a proposal always plays a final contract feasible for him and his
partner’s final payoff is never greater than the one he is willing to give her.
Proposition 4.3. After every proposal, the woman’s payoff increases strictly by at least ε.
Remark 4.3. Due to the monotonicity of women’s payoffs, once a man matches with j0, he exits
the market and remains single forever.
Theorem 4.1. The propose-dispose algorithm ends in finite time.
Proof. Since the strategy sets are compact and the payoff functions are continuous, they are
bounded. Proposition 4.3 implies that the algorithm ends in a finite number of iterations.
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Definition 4.1. Let pi = (µ, x, y) be a matching profile. A pair (i, j) ∈ (M ∪ {i0}) × (W ∪ {j0})
is a ε-blocking pair if, (1) they are not a couple in µ, and (2) there exits a strategy profile
(s, t) ∈ Xi × Yj such that Ui,j(s, t) > ui(pi) + ε and Vi,j(s, t) > vj(pi) + ε. A matching profile is
ε-externally stable if it does not have any ε-blocking pair.
Theorem 4.2. The matching profile pi, output of algorithm 1, is ε-externally stable.
Proof. Let (i, j) be a ε-blocking pair of the matching profile pi := (µ, x, y) with some strategy profile
(s, t) ∈ Xi × Yj. Suppose µi = j0, so man i is single in pi. Thus, the last time i proposed, the
solution to his optimization problem was j0. In particular it held, ui ≥ Ui,k(x
′, y′),∀k ∈W, (x′, y′) ∈
Xi × Yk such that Vi,k(x
′, y′) ≥ vk + ε, with vk the payoff of woman k at that moment. As the
woman’s payoffs are increasing, we obtain that ui ≥ Ui,k(x
′, y′),∀k ∈ W, (x′, y′) ∈ Xi × Yk such
that Vi,k(x
′, y′) ≥ vk(pi) + ε, where now vk(pi) is the k’s final payoff. This contradicts that (i, j)
is a ε-blocking pair, so man i must be matched with someone. The rest of the proof can be split
in two cases: either i proposed to µi, she was single, and nobody else proposed to her afterwards,
so i did not compete with anybody for µi; or i competed at least once with someone for µi, and
won. Let T be the iteration in which i got automatically accepted by µi and afterwards nobody
else proposed to her, or be the last iteration in which i competed with someone for µi.
Suppose the first case. Since i proposed at T to µi and not to j, it held at iteration T that
Ui,µi(x
T , yT )>Ui,j(s, t), with (x
T , yT ) the optimal contract computed when solved (Pi(v)) at the
time. Moreover, since µi did not receive any other proposal afterwards, the contract (x, y) that i
and µi play in pi corresponds to (x
T , yT ). By proposition 4.3, if j was not the optimal woman for
i at iteration T , neither it is afterwards, as µi kept her payoff constant due to the absence of any
posterior proposal. This contradicts that (i, j) is a ε-blocking pair.
Suppose the second case. Let i′ be the contender of i. Necessarily, i won the competition.
Since µi was not proposed to after T , i’s final payoff ui(pi) corresponds to the optimal value of the
problem (P newi,µi (λi′)) at time T . Let (xˆ, yˆ, λi) be the solution to (P
max
i,µi
(u2i )) when i and i
′ competed.
It holds ui(pi) ≥ Ui,µi(xˆ, yˆ) as at the moment of solving (P
new
i,µi
(λi′)), it held that λi ≥ λi′ . Since
j 6= µi, it holds that Ui,µi(xˆ, yˆ)> Ui,j(s, t), contradicting that (i, j) is a ε-blocking pair.
Remark 4.4. When players have integer payoffs, as is the case in Gale-Shapley [15], Kelso-
Crawford [18] and Gale-Demange-Sotomayor [11], considering ε = 1 gives an exact solution.
Moreover, our propose-dispose algorithm coincides with the first of two algorithms proposed by
Gale, Demange and Sotomayor [11].
The existence of ε-externally stable matching profiles allows us to prove the existence of the
ε = 0 case, passing through the compactness of the sets of strategies, continuity of payoff functions
and the finiteness of players. The proof of the next theorem (and above propositions) may be found
in the appendix.
Theorem 4.3. For any matching game with compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions,
there always exists a 0-externally stable matching profile.
An interesting family of strategic games in which the output of our algorithm is also internally
stable is the class of Common interest games: Ui,j = Vi,j for all couples (i, j) ∈ M × W
because, when a man maximizes his payoff, he also does it for the partner. In general however,
the constructed externally stable matching profile will not be internally stable. Section 5 explains
how, under some assumptions on the family of strategic games, one can, from any externally stable
matching, construct an (externally and internally) stable one.
10
4.2 Propose-Dispose Algorithm’s Complexity
Gale-Shapley’s, Balinski-Ratier’s and Balinski-Baiou [5, 4] algorithms for finding stable matchings
run in at most (n − 1)2 iterations, where n = max(|M |, |W |). We can prove a similar bound for
algorithm 1. Indeed, proposition 4.3 allows us to bound from above the number of proposals that
each woman needs in order to achieve her maximum possible payoff. Clearly, if all women reach
this maximum value, algorithm 1 ends. Let j ∈W be a woman. Consider the value,
Vˆj := max{Vi,j(x, y) : i ∈M ∪ {i0}, (x, y) ∈ Xi × Yj} − vj ,
being the difference between j’s best payoff and her individually rational payoff. Since women start
matched with the empty man, each of them needs at most nj := Vˆj/ε proposals to achieve her best
possible payoff. Then, algorithm 1 is guaranteed to end in at most N :=
∑
j∈W nj =
1
ε
∑
j∈W Vˆj ,
iterations.
If Gale-Shapley’s model is mapped into a matching game in which players get a payoff of k if
they match with their k-th best option, then it holds Vˆj = n − 1. Thus, considering ε = 1, we
recover Gale-Shapley’s bound. Note however that each iteration in algorithm 1 is potentially very
costly because it necessitates to solve three optimization problems.
4.3 On the Lattice Structure
In the literature, the set of pairwise stable matching profiles satisfy a lattice structure. In our case,
a partial lattice structure is satisfied. Let pi = (µ, x, y) and pi′ = (µ′, x′, y′) be two externally stable
matching profiles such that (∗∗) whenever a man/woman has the same utility in both matching,
he/she has the same woman/man in both (i.e ∀i ∈ M , if Ui,µi(xi, yµi) = Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
) then µi =
µ′i, and similarly for the woman). This is satisfied in the Gale-Shapley model and is satisfied
“generically” in the sense that, if we discretize the strategy spaces and perturb the payoff functions,
then (∗∗) holds for any pair of matchings and so for any pair of externally stable matchings.
Consider the new triple pi∨ := (µ∨, x∨, y∨) defined by
µ∨i = argmax
{
Ui,µi(xi, yµi) ; Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)
}
,∀i ∈M,
with the corresponding strategy profile (x∨i , y
∨
µ∨i
) (uniquely defined when a man is not married to
the same woman, or chosen by a selection otherwise).
Theorem 4.4. Under (∗∗), the triple (pi∨, x∨, y∨) is an externally stable matching profile.
Proof. The proof has two steps. We first prove that pi∨ is a matching and then that the triple
(pi∨, x∨, y∨) is externally stable. For the first part, let i, k ∈M be two men such that µ∨i = µ
∨
k = j,
with j 6= j0. It follows,
j = argmax
{
Ui,j(xi, yj) ; Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)
}
= argmax
{
Uk,µk(xk, yµk) ; Uk,j(x
′
k, y
′
j)
}
Suppose j = µi = µ
′
k. Then j 6= µk, and so Uk,µk(xk, yµk) < Uk,j(x
′
k, y
′
j) by (∗∗). Since pi
′ is
externally stable, it must hold that Vk,j(x
′
k, y
′
j) > Vi,j(xi, yj), otherwise (i, j) would block pi
′ using
(xi, yj) (observe that Vk,j(x
′
k, y
′
j) 6= Vi,j(xi, yj) by (∗∗)). Consequently, as pi is externally stable,
it must hold that Uk,j(x
′
k, y
′
j)<Uk,µk(xk, yµk), otherwise (k, j) would block pi using (x
′
k, y
′
j). This
contradicts that j = argmax{Uk,µk(xk, yµk);Uk,j(x
′
k, y
′
j)}. Thus pi
∨ is a matching.
For external stability, suppose (i, j) is a blocking pair for (pi∨, x∨, y∨), using the strategy profile
(s, t). In particular (∗ ∗ ∗) Ui,j(s, t)>max{Ui,µi(xi, yµi);Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)}. Suppose j = j0. If µi 6= j0
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(resp. if µ′i 6= j0) then µ (resp. µ
′) is not externally stable because i prefers being single to his
partner in µ (resp. in µ′): a contradiction with the external stability of µ (resp. µ′). Otherwise,
µi = µ
′
i = j, which is also a contradiction with (∗ ∗ ∗). Hence j 6= j0. Let then i
′ be the partner of
j in pi∨. Then, (i′, j) are together in one of the matchings µ or µ′, and (i, j) can block it using the
strategy profile (s, t): a contradiction. Thus (pi∨, x∨, y∨) is externally stable.
Remark 4.5. If µ∧ denotes the min operation matching in which each man is coupled with his
worst woman between pi and pi′, the output is not necessarily an externally stable matching. In that
sense, we only have a semi-lattice structure contrarily to Gale-Shapley.
Remark 4.6. The semi-lattice structure is still valid if we exchange the roles of men and women:
under (∗∗), if ν∨ gives to each woman her best man between µ and µ′, then the output is an
externally stable matching profile.
Remark 4.7. As consequence of the above, the classical equality between the max for men / min
for women operations in the Gale-Shapley model does not hold in our model (µ∧ 6= ν∨). Quite the
opposite may even be true, for example if all (Gi,j)i∈M,j∈W are common-interest games, the max
for men coincides with for the max for women (ν∨ = µ∨) and so, not with the min for women as
is usually the case.
The question we address now is whether algorithm 1 converges to the best ε-stable matching
for men (as is the case in Gale-Shapley). Let Γε be the set of ε-externally stable matching profiles,
for a fixed ε ≥ 0. Suppose that (∗∗)ε is satisfied between any pair in Γε, that is, ∀i ∈ M , if
|Ui,µi(xi, yµi) − Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)| ≤ ε then µi = µ′i, and similarly for woman. Γε can be endowed
with the partial order >M defined by ∀(µ, x, y), (µ
′, x′, y′) ∈ Γε, (µ, x, y)>M (µ
′, x′, y′) if and only
if Ui(µ, x, y) ≥ Ui(µ
′, x′, y′),∀i ∈M , and at least one man increases his payoff in at least ε.
Theorem 4.4 holds over the set Γε when considering property (∗∗)ε. We omit its proof as it
follows exactly the same arguments. We obtain that the pair (Γε, >M ) is a partial order set in
which any two pair of elements (µ, x, y), (µ′, x′, y′) have a maximum in Γε, defined by (µ
∨, x∨, y∨).
Notice that, even though the definition of the maximum between two matching profiles is the same
to the case ε = 0, by property (∗∗)ε, we can guarantee that at least one man will increase his payoff
by at least ε.
Observe that whenever (∗∗)ε is satisfied between any pair in Γε, all maximal elements of (Γε, >M )
correspond to a unique matching, denoted µM . Although strategy profiles between two maximal
elements may differ, the difference between each man’s utilities is not greater than ε. Hence,
considering equivalent all matching profiles where men’s utilities do not differ by more than ε, the
best ε-stable matching payoff for men is well defined and it is (ε-)unique. As in Gale-Shapley,
we will prove that algorithm 1, in which men propose and women dispose, will output a maximal
element piM of (Γε, >M ). To prove this property, given a man i ∈ M , consider his best stable
woman wi ∈W ∪ {j0} defined by,
(wi, xi, yi) ∈ argmax{Ui,j(x
′
i, y
′
j) : ((i, j), x
′
i, y
′
j) ∈ (µ, x, y) ∈ Γε}.
From the uniqueness of the maximal matching in Γε, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. If (∗∗)ε is satisfied between any pair in Γε, the following two properties hold:
1. For any two different men i, k ∈M , it holds that wi 6= wk.
2. Any matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) in which at least for one man i it holds Ui(pi)>Ui(piM )+ε,
is not ε-externally stable.
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We state a second lemma whose proof is included in the appendix.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose (∗∗)ε is satisfied between any pair in Γε. Let t be an iteration of algorithm 1
and i ∈M be the current proposer man. Let wi ∈W be i’s best stable woman. Then, there always
exists a strategy profile (x, y) ∈ Xi × Ywi such that Vi,wi(x, y) ≥ V
t
wi
+ ε, with V twi the payoff of wi
at time t.
Theorem 4.5. If (∗∗)ε is satisfied between any pair in Γε, then the matching profile pi = (µ, x, y)
obtained with algorithm 1 is men ε-optimal, that is, it corresponds to piM .
Proof. From lemma 4.2, along all iterations of algorithm 1, given a man i ∈ M , his best stable
woman wi is always feasible for him. Therefore, i’s final payoff is bounded from below by the one
he can get with wi. Since this is also the maximum payoff that men can get in a ε-externally stable
matching profile, we conclude that all men obtain their highest possible payoff under ε-external
stability.
Remark 4.8. Using arguments similar to [12], one can prove that algorithm 1 is strategy-proof
on men’s side: if men revealed their utility functions to a designer who run the algorithm, men’s
dominant strategy is to submit their true utility functions. In practice, by lying they will not increase
their payoff in more than ε.
Remark 4.9. Exchanging the roles of men and women in algorithm 1 allows us to find the women
ε-optimal matching profile.
4.3.1 Zero-Sum and Strictly Competitive Games
Suppose that (∗∗) holds for every pair of externally stable matchings and that all the family
of games Gi,j,∀i ∈ M, j ∈ W , are zero-sum games, that is, for any couple (i, j) it holds that
Ui,j(·, ·) = −Vi,j(·, ·) = gi,j(·, ·). As women’s payoffs decrease when men’s payoffs increase, we
obtain a full lattice structure on the set of externally stable matching profiles Γ. Indeed, let
µ, µ′ ∈ Γ and their minimum µ∧ defined by,
µ∧i := argmin{Ui,µi(xi, yµi);Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)},∀i ∈M
:= argmin{−Vi,µi(xi, yµi);−Vi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′
i
)},∀i ∈M
:= argmax{Vi,µi(xi, yµi);Vi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)} = ν∨i ,∀i ∈M
Hence, the worst between two externally stable matchings for men corresponds to the best between
the two for women and so we recover a usual lattice structure.
Notice that the computations made for µ∧ still hold if the zero-sum payoff function gi,j is
composed with some strictly monotone function Ui,j = φi,j(gi,j) for player i and Vi,j = ψi,j(gi,j)
for player j (see appendix for the details). This allows us to extend the lattice structure to strictly
competitive games Gi,j in which, whenever i’s payoff increases (resp. decreases), j’s payoff decreases
(resp. increases) and vice-versa.
Remark 4.10. Aumann [3], who introduced the family of monotone games, also defined the class S
in which payoff functions are obtained via monotone transformations of a zero-sum game. Although
he conjectured that S must cover all strictly competitive games, the proof is only known for finite
games, and was established quite recently [2].
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4.4 Shapley-Shubik’s and Gale-Demange’s models
Shapley-Shubik’s model [27] consists of a housing market with buyers and sellers, where each seller
has a house to sell and each buyer is interested in buying a house. A solution to this problem is
a pair (µ, p), with µ a matching between sellers and buyers, and p a vector of positive monetary
transfers from buyers to sellers for each house. Each seller i ∈ S, has a cost of his/her house ci,
and each buyer j ∈ B, has a valuation hi,j for j’s house. If seller i sells his/her house to j at price
pi ≥ 0, their payoffs are Ui,j(pi) = pi − ci and Vi,j(pi) = hi,j − pi, respectively. Gale and Demange
[10] generalized the problem as follows. If two agents i, j are paired, their payoffs are given by some
strictly increasing and continuous payoff functions φi,j(t) for i, and ψi,j(−t) for j, with t ∈ R being
the net transfer from i to j (t ≥ 0 means that j pays t to i and t ≤ 0 means that i pays −t to j).
Gale and Demange also assume each player is given an individually rational payoff.
Gale-Demange’s model can be mapped into a matching game in which all couples play a strictly
competitive games in the class S as follows. Let Gi,j = (S, T, Ui,j , Vi,j), with S = T = R+,
Ui,j(s, t) = φi,j(t − s) and Vi,j(s, t) = ψi,j(s − t), for any (i, j) ∈ M ×W . Note that payoffs are
obtained as a monotone transformation of the zero-sum game in which player i gets g(s, t) = t− s
and j gets −g(s, t) = s−t. Consequently, the results of this section apply to this problem to recover
the existence of externally stable matching and their lattice structure.12
For the link with Hatfield and Milgrom [17], see Appendix B.
Remark 4.11. Observe that the unique Nash equilibrium of the underlying strictly competitive
games are s∗ = t∗ = 0: no monetary transfers in the Gale-Demange’s problem (or zero prices in
the Shapley-Shubik housing market). Hence, external stability and Nash stability are incompatible
in the Gale-Demange model. As will be seen in the next section, this is not the case when internal
stability replaces Nash stability.
5 Playing Different Games: Feasibility and Internal Stability
Theorem 4.2 proves the existence of externally stable matching profiles for any family of games. To
obtain matching profiles that are also internally stable, we need an additional assumption on the
two-person games (called feasibility).
Along all section 5, players will be given outside options, that must not be confused with their
individually rational payoffs. Indeed, players’ outside options may be higher than their IRPs as
they may symbolize possible payoffs obtained when matching with other players.
Definition 5.1. Let (i, j) ∈ M ×W be a couple and u0i , v
0
j be their outside options. A contract
(x, y) ∈ Xi × Yj is (u
0
i , v
0
j )-feasible for (i, j) if it holds Ui,j(x, y) ≥ u
0
i and Vi,j(x, y) ≥ v
0
j .
Definition 5.2. Consider a couple (i, j) ∈M×W . A (u0i , v
0
j )-feasible contract (x
′, y′) is a (u0i , v
0
j )-
constrained Nash equilibrium if for any (x, y) ∈ Xi × Yj, it holds:
1. If Ui,j(x, y
′)>Ui,j(x
′, y′) then Vi,j(x, y
′)<v0j and,
2. If Vi,j(x
′, y)>Vi,j(x
′, y′) then Ui,j(x
′, y)<u0i .
The set of (u0i , v
0
j )-constrained Nash equilibria is denoted CNE(u
0
i , v
0
j ).
When outside options represent the highest payoff that a player can credibly get with another
partner, the notions of constrained Nash equilibrium coincides with internal stability, as defined in
section 2, since any profitable deviation breaks the external stability.
12The strategy sets in the Gale-Demange matching game are not compact, but since transfers are naturally bounded
by players’ valuation or by the individually rational payoffs, the problem can easily be compactified.
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Definition 5.3. A two-person game G is feasible if for any outside options (u0, v0) ∈ R
2, such
that there exists at least one (u0, v0)-feasible contract, there exists a (u0, v0)-constrained equilibrium.
Feasibility is a necessary condition for the existence of an externally and internally stable match-
ing profile. Imagine we have one single man and one single woman, who can play a two player game
G or remain single and get their individually rational payoffs (u0, v0). If there is at least one (u0, v0)-
feasible contract, then being single is externally unstable. But if there is no (u0, v0)-constrained
equilibrium, then there is no externally and internally stable outcome. Consequently, we suppose
along the rest of this section that all two-player games Gi,j , i ∈M and j ∈W are feasible.
Remark 5.1. As will be proven later, the class of feasible games includes potential games, zero
sum games, strictly competitive games and infinitely repeated games, among others.
Our next theorem 5.1 proves that starting from any externally matching profile and modifying
one by one the strategy profiles of each couple by a constrained Nash equilibrium (which is possible
by feasibility), external stability is preserved.
Formally, let pi = (µ, x, y) be a matching profile and (i, j) ∈ M ×W be an arbitrary man and
an arbitrary woman. Consider the sets Bi, Aj defined by,
Bi := {(b, s, r) ∈ (W ∪ {j0})×Xi × Yb : Ui,b(s, r)>ui(pi) + ε},
Aj := {(a, s, r) ∈ (M ∪ {i0})×Xa × Yj : Va,j(s, r)>vj(pi) + ε}.
Sets Bi and Aj contain all acceptable agents for i and j respectively, that is, all agents that can
offer them a payoff higher than their current one. Consider the outside options u0i , v
0
j defined by,
u0i := max{Ui,b(x, y) : (i, x, y) ∈ Ab, b 6= µi}, v
0
j := max{Va,j(x, y) : (j, x, y) ∈ Ba, a 6= µj}
that is, the best payoff that i and j can get outside of their couple by matching with a person who
may accept them.
Lemma 5.1. Let pi = (µ, x, y) be a matching profile and (i, j) be a ε-blocking pair of pi. Then, it
holds that Ui,µi(xi, yµi)+ε<u
0
i and Vµj ,j(xµj , yj)+ε< v
0
j , with u
0
i , v
0
j defined as above. Conversely,
if either Ui,µi(xi, yµi) + ε<u
0
i or Vµj ,j(xµj , yj) + ε< v
0
j , then there exists a ε-blocking pair of pi.
Proof. Let (i, j) be a blocking pair of pi, with respect to a strategy profile (s, r) ∈ Xi×Yj. It holds,
Ui,j(s, r)>Ui,µi(xi, yµi) + ε and Vi,j(s, r)>Vµj ,j(xµj , yj) + ε. In particular, note that (i, s, r) ∈ Aj
and (j, s, r) ∈ Bi. Then, u
0
i ≥ Ui,j(s, r)>Ui,µi(xi, yµi) + ε and v
0
j ≥ Vi,j(s, r)>Vµj ,j(xµj , yj) +ε.
Conversely, suppose it holds Ui,µi(xi, yµi)+ε<u
0
i . Let (b, s, r) be the solution when i computed u
0
i .
Thus, b and i are not matched, Vi,b(s, r)>Vµb,b(xµb , yb) + ε (since (i, s, r) ∈ Ab), and Ui,b(s, r) =
u0i >Ui,µi(xi, yµi) + ε. Therefore, (i, b) is a ε-blocking pair of pi.
If pi is a ε-externally stable matching profile, lemma 5.1 implies that the outside options of
all couples are never greater than their current payoffs. Therefore, if (i, j) ∈ µ, (xi, yj) is always
(u0i , v
0
j )-feasible and, because of feasibility, there always exists a (u
0
i , v
0
j )-constrained Nash equilib-
rium (xˆi, yˆj). Moreover, if at any iteration a couple replaces (xi, yj) by a Nash equilibrium (u
0
i ,
v0j )-feasible, they keep playing the same strategy profile during all posterior iterations. If cou-
ples cannot replace their strategy profile by a Nash equilibrium, the choice of a constrained Nash
equilibrium is made by an oracle (see algorithm 2).
The convergence of algorithm 2 does not directly hold as the sets of acceptable agents change
at each iteration. Indeed, if by playing a constrained Nash equilibrium an agent decreases his/her
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Algorithm 2: Strategy profiles modification
input : pi ε-externally stable matching profile
1 repeat
2 for (i, j) ∈ µ : i 6= i0 and j 6= j0 do
3 Compute the sets Aj, Bi for all i ∈M and j ∈W and the outside options u
0
i , v
0
j
4 If (xi, yj) /∈ CNE(u
0
i , v
0
j ), consider (xˆi, yˆj) ∈ NEi,j ∩ CNE(u
0
i , v
0
j ) if the intersection
is non-empty or (xˆi, yˆj) ∈ CNE(u
0
i , v
0
j ) otherwise
5 Replace (xi, yj) by (xˆi, yˆj)
6 until convergence;
payoff, his/her set of acceptable agents enlarges. Therefore, his/her outside option may change
and his/her constrained Nash equilibrium may not be an equilibrium anymore. However, if after
changing all strategy profiles of pi, the sets of acceptable agents remain invariant, the current
matching profile is indeed internally stable and the algorithm stops. As will be proved, a judicious
selection of the oracle may guarantee the convergence in potential games, zero-sum games, strictly
competitive games, and infinitely repeated games.
Theorem 5.1. If algorithm 2 converges, its output is a ε-externally stable and internally stable
matching profile.
Proof. Let pi = (µ, x, y) be the input of algorithm 2. Note that by construction, if the algorithm
ends then, the output is internally stable. Concerning external stability, we aim to prove that if
pit, the matching profile before iteration t, is externally stable then, pit+1 is externally stable as
well. Let (i, µi) be the couple that changes of strategy profile at iteration t. Let (xi, yµi) be their
strategy profile at iteration t and (xˆi, yˆµi) at time t+1. Suppose there exists (a, b) /∈ µ a ε-blocking
pair of pit+1, so there exists a strategy profile (s, r) ∈ Xa × Yb such that Ua,b(s, r)>Ua,µa(pit+1) + ε
and Va,b(s, r)>Uµb,b(pit+1) + ε. If a 6= i (and analogously if b 6= µi) then Ua,µa(pit+1) = Ua,µa(pit).
Thus, it cannot hold that a 6= i and b 6= µi, otherwise the pair (a, b) would also be a ε-blocking
pair of pit. Without loss of generality, suppose that a = i. In particular, b 6= µi because a and b
are not a couple. It holds, Vi,b(s, r)>Vb,µb(pit+1) + ε = Vb,µb(pit)+ ε, so i ∈ Ab at iteration t. Then,
if u0i is i’s outside option at iteration t, it holds u
0
i ≥ Ui,b(s, r) = Ua,b(s, r)>Ua,µa(pit+1) + ε =
Ui,j(xˆi, yˆµi) + ε>Ui,j(xˆi, yˆµi). This contradicts the fact that (xˆi, yˆµi) is (u
0
i , v
0
j )-feasible.
Remark 5.2. Theorem 5.1 holds for ε = 0 (the blocking pair’s definition considers a strict in-
equality). Therefore, we obtain the existence of externally and internally stable matching, for any
instance with feasible games such that algorithm 2 converges.
5.1 Zero-Sum Games are Feasible
Recall that a zero-sum game has the form G = (X,Y, g), with player’s payoff functions satisfying
u(·, ·) = −v(·, ·) =: g(·, ·). Therefore, given (u1, v2) player’s outside options, with u1<v2, a contract
(x, y) ∈ X × Y is feasible if and only if it satisfies u1 ≤ g(x, y) ≤ v2. Similarly, a feasible
contract (x′, y′) is a (u1, v2)-constrained Nash equilibrium if for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y , it holds
that, if g(x, y′)>g(x′, y′) then, g(x, y′)>v2 and, if g(x
′, y)<g(x′, y′) then, g(x′, y)<u1.
Theorem 5.2. Let G = (X,Y, g) be a zero-sum game, with X,Y compact convex subsets of topo-
logical vector spaces and g separately continuous. Then G is feasible if and only if it has a value.
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Proof. Feasibility implies the existence of the value (take u1 = −∞ and v2 = +∞). Conversely,
suppose the game G has a value w and by continuity of g and compactness of X and Y , players have
optimal strategies (x∗, y∗). Let (x′, y′) be a feasible contract (u1 ≤ g(x
′, y′) ≤ v2). The analysis is
split in three cases.
Case 1. u1 ≤ w ≤ v2. It holds that the optimal contract (x
∗, y∗) is feasible. The result holds
directly since (x∗, y∗) is a saddle point and any unilateral deviation decreases the payoff of the
player who changes his/her strategy. In other words, (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium.
Case 2. w<u1<v2. Consider the function h(x) := supy∈Y g(x, y) and the set A(u1) := {x ∈
X : h(x) ≥ u1} = {x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ Y, g(x, y) ≥ u1}, that is, the set of all strategies x such that there
is at least one y that gives player 1 more than u1. Since (x
′, y′) is a feasible contract, x′ ∈ A(u1),
so A(u1) is non empty. Consider the optimization problem
(P ) sup
x∈A(u1)
inf
y∈Y s.t.
g(x,y)≥u1
g(x, y)
For a given x0 ∈ A(u1), the set {y ∈ Y : g(x0, y) ≥ u1} is bounded so, there exists an infimum
y0(x0). Then, as the set A(u1) is also bounded, there exists a supremum x0. Let (x0, y0(x0)) be the
pair supremum-infimum solution of (P ). We claim that, either (x0, y0(x0)) is a constrained Nash
equilibrium and g(x0, y0(x0)) = u1, or there exists a constrained Nash equilibrium with payoff
u1. First of all, observe that the contract satisfies g(x0, y0(x0)) ≥ u1 by construction. Suppose
that g(x0, y0(x0))>u1. Since w<u1, it holds w<u1<g(x0, y0(x0)). Considering the optimal
contract (x∗, y∗) that achieves the value of the game and recalling that it is a saddle point, it holds,
g(x0, y
∗) ≤ g(x∗, y∗) = w<u1<g(x0, y0(x0)). By continuity of the function g(x0, ·), there exists
λ ∈ (0, 1) such that g(x0, yλ) = u1, with yλ = λy
∗ + (1 − λ)y0(x0) ∈ Y . This contradicts the
fact that (x0, y(x0)) is the solution to (P ), since yλ minimizes the function further g(x0, ·). Thus,
g(x0, y(x0)) = u1. If this contract is a constrained Nash equilibrium, the study of the second case
is done. If not, consider yt ∈ Y as the convex combination between y(x0) and y
∗ with t computed
by,
t := sup{t ∈ [0, 1] : yt := (1− t)y(x0) + ty
∗ and ∃xt ∈ X, g(xt, yt) = u1}
Note that t does exist as when considering t = 0, there exists x0 such that g(x0, y(x0)) = u1. Even
more, it does not hold that yt = y
∗, since the contract (x∗, y∗) is a saddle point, g(x∗, y∗) =
w<u1 and any deviation of player 1 decreases the payoff. We claim that (xt, yt) is a con-
strained Nash equilibrium and that g(xt, yt) = u1. By construction, the second property holds
directly. Suppose that (xt, yt) is not a constrained Nash equilibrium, so there exists (xˆ, yˆ) such
that u1 = g(xt, yt)<g(xˆ, yt)<v2 or u1<g(xt, yˆ)<g(xt, yt) = u1. Clearly, the second does not
hold. Therefore, player 1 has a feasible and profitable deviation, meaning that he/she is able to
profitably deviate and still guarantee his/her outside option to player 2. As a summary, it holds,
g(x∗, y∗) = w<u1 = g(xt, yt)<g(xˆ, yt) with yt ∈ (y(x0), y
∗). However, as before, by the continuity
of g and the convexity of Y , there exists an element z ∈ (yt, y
∗) such that g(xˆ, z) = u1, contradicting
the fact that t is a supremum. Thus, (xt, yt) is a constrained Nash equilibrium.
Case 3. u1<v2<w. Analogously to case 2, there exists a feasible constrained Nash equilibrium
(x, y) with g(x, y) = v2.
Conclusion. If G has a value w, then it is feasible, and the constrained Nash equilibrium (x, y)
satisfies g(x, y) = median(u1, v2, w).
Remark 5.3. If g is quasi-concave in x and quasi-convex in y then, G satisfies Sion’s minmax
theorem [28]. Thus, from theorem 5.2, a game satisfying these assumptions has a value and it is
feasible. Similarly if g is the mixed extension of a finite game, or of a compact-continuous game,
it holds the same result.
17
Playing the value of the game is an absorbing state for algorithm 2, as the optimal strategies
are a Nash equilibrium and remain always feasible. However, couples do not always reach the value
of their game since this one may not be compatible with their outside options. For example, in the
Shapley-Shubik housing market game, Nash stability implies zero prices, which is not individually
rational for the sellers.
Lemma 5.2. Let pi = (µ, x, y) be an externally stable matching and (i, j) be a matched couple.
Let wi,j be the value of their game. Consider the sequence of outside options of (i, j) denoted by
(uti, v
t
j)t, with t being the iterations of algorithm 2. If there exists t
∗ such that wi,j ≤ u
t
i (resp.
wi,j ≥ v
t
j ), then the subsequence (u
t
i)t≥t∗ (resp. (v
t
j)t≥t∗) is non increasing (resp. non decreasing).
Proof. Suppose that there exists an iteration t in which wi,j ≤ u
t
i ≤ v
t
j, so couple (i, j) switches its
payoff to uti. Let (xˆi, yˆj) be the constrained Nash equilibrium played by (i, j) at iteration t. Let
t′ be the next iteration in which (i, j) moves. Since (xˆi, yˆj) must be (u
t′
i , v
t′
j )-feasible, in particular
it holds ut
′
i ≤ gi,j(xˆi, yˆj) = u
t
i. Therefore, the sequence of outside options starting from t is non
increasing.
Lemma 5.2 allows to prove that algorithm 2 converges, under any oracle.
Theorem 5.3. Consider that all games Gi,j, with (i, j) ∈ M ×W are zero-sum games, each of
them with a value wi,j . Then, algorithm 2 converges for any oracle.
Proof. The proof relies strongly on the monotonicity of outside options (lemma 5.2). Note that at
the beginning of algorithm 2 all couples (i, j) belong to one (not necessarily the same) of the three
following cases: u0i ≤ wi,j ≤ v
0
j , wi,j ≤ u
0
i ≤ v
0
j or u
0
i ≤ v
0
j ≤ wi,j. In the first case, the couple plays
a Nash equilibrium and never changes it afterwards. In the second case, since u0i is non increasing
for i and bounded from below by the value of the game, his sequence of outside options converges.
Analogously, the sequences of outside options for j converges on the third case. Therefore, the sets
of acceptable agents converge to fixed sets and so, algorithm 2 converges to an internally stable
matching.
5.2 Strictly Competitive Games are Feasible
The subclass of strictly competitive games S defined by Aumann as those games obtained by
monotone transformations of zero-sum games, inherits all the properties that we have proved for
zero-sum games, as regards feasibility and convergence of algorithm 2, as we prove below.
Consider a strictly competitive game G = (X,Y, u, v), with X,Y compact sets and u, v con-
tinuous function. Payoff functions satisfy that for any x, x′ ∈ X, y, y′ ∈ Y , if u(x′, y′) ≥ u(x, y)
then, v(x′, y′) ≤ v(x, y), and vice-versa. Let ϕ, φ be increasing13 functions such that the game
G′ = (X,Y, ϕ◦u, φ◦v) is a zero-sum game. Nash equilibria of G and G′ coincide, and Nash equilib-
rium payoffs are the image through the increasing functions from one game to another. In particular,
if w is the value of G′, then (ϕ−1(w), φ−1(w)) is a Nash equilibrium payoff of G. Let (u0, v0) be
outside options of players (i, j) in G, and let (x∗, y∗) be a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium.
Consider the corresponding outside options in G′ given by u′0 := ϕ(u0), v
′
0 := −φ(v0). Note that,
indeed u′0 and v
′
0 are outside options for (i, j) in their zero-sum game since, for any (x, y) ∈ X × Y
such that u0 ≤ u(x, y) and v0 ≤ v(x, y), it holds ϕ(u0) ≤ ϕ(u(x, y)) = −φ(v(x, y)) = v
′
0.
Also, (x∗, y∗) is (u′0, v
′
0)-feasible in game G
′, and it is direct that (x∗, y∗) is a (u′0, v
′
0)-constrained
13For the model of matching with transfers it is enough to consider increasing transformations, so we limit the
study to this kind of monotone transformations. Nevertheless, the cases in which both transformations are decreasing
functions or one is increasing and the other decreasing, are analogues.
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Nash equilibrium, since increasing functions preserve inequalities. From theorem 5.2, it holds
ϕ(u(x∗, y∗)) = −φ(v(x∗, y∗)) = median(u′0, v
′
0, w). Thus, u(x
∗, y∗) = median(u0, ϕ
−1(v′0), ϕ
−1(w)),
v(x∗, y∗) = median(φ−1(−u′0), v0, φ
−1(−w)). We conclude the following theorem.
Theorem 5.4. Let G = (X,Y, u, v) be a strictly competitive game and ϕ, φ increasing func-
tions such that the game G′ = (X,Y, ϕ ◦ u, φ ◦ v) is a zero-sum game with value w. Then,
given u0, v0 outside options in G, a strategy profile (x
∗, y∗) is a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equi-
librium of G if and only if it satisfies, u(x∗, y∗) = median{u0, ϕ
−1(−φ(v0)), ϕ
−1(w)}, v(x∗, y∗) =
median{φ−1(−ϕ(u0)), v0, φ
−1(−w)}.
Theorem 5.4 extends the results of zero-sum games to the subclass S of strictly competitive
games. In particular, it implies that games on S are feasible, and that algorithm 2 converges when
couples play this kind of games.
Shapley-Shubik’s and Gale-Demange’s models can be mapped into a matching game in which
all strategic games Gi,j are included in the class S, so our results apply directly to their works
proving the existence of matchings that are not only externally stable, but also internally stable.
The refinement induced by internal stability crucially depends on the choice of the strategic games
Gi,j as explained in the introduction. For example, if we model the game between a buyer and a
seller as an ultimatum game where the buyer is the first proposer, he will get all the surplus, and
vice-versa if the first proposer is the buyer. However, if the game is an alternative offer bargaining
game, the surplus is shared equally.
5.3 Potential Games are Feasible
Theorem 5.5. If G is an ordinal potential game, then G is feasible.
Proof. Let φ be the potential function of G, (u0i , v
0
j ) outside options and Z
0 ⊆ Xi×Yj the set of all
(u0i , v
0
j )-feasible contracts. From the continuity of payoff functions, Z
0 is compact. Suppose there
exists (x, y) ∈ Z0 and consider the problem,
(R) max{φ(s, t) : (s, t) ∈ Z0}
(R) always has a solution as Z0 is a non empty compact set and φ is continuous. It holds that any
solution (x′, y′) is (u0i , v
0
j )-feasible, and as it is the maximum of φ, (x
′, y′) is a (u0i , v
0
j )-constrained
Nash equilibrium. Indeed, consider a contract (s, t) ∈ Xi × Yj, and suppose that u(s, y
′)>u(x′, y′)
and v(s, y′) ≥ v0j . In particular, it holds that u(s, y
′)>u(x′, y′) ≥ u0i , so (s, y
′) ∈ Z0. Moreover,
φ(s, y′)>φ(x′, y′) since u(s, y′)>u(x′, y′). This contradicts the fact that (x′, y′) is a solution of
(R). Analogously, if v(x′, t)>v(x′, y′), then, u(x′, t)<u0i . Thus, (x
′, y′) is a constrained Nash
equilibrium.
Theorem 5.6. Consider that all games Gi,j , with (i, j) ∈M×W , are potential games. In addition,
suppose that constrained Nash equilibria are chosen at each iteration by maximizing the potential
function of the couple over the set of (u0i , v
0
j )-feasible contracts. Then, algorithm 2 converges.
Proof. Consider a couple (i, j) and (xˆti, yˆ
t
j)t their sequence of constrained Nash equilibria along the
iterations. Since (xˆt−1i , yˆ
t−1
j ) is always feasible for the following iteration, the sequence φi,j(xˆ
t
i, yˆ
t
j)t
is non-decreasing over t. Then, as the potential functions are continuous and the strategy sets
are compact, the sequences φi,j(xˆ
t
i, yˆ
t
j)t are convergent for all couples (i, j). Thus, algorithm 2
converges.
19
5.4 Not All Finite Static Games are Feasible
Consider the following14 matrix game G, played in mixed strategies,
L M R
T 2,1 -10,-10 3,0
M 3,0 2,1 -10,-10
B -10,-10 3,0 2,1
Game G has only one Nash equilibrium, which is completely mixed, with payoffs −5/3 and −3
for players 1 and 2 respectively. Considering outside options u0 = v0 = 0, G does not have any
(u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium, even though there are (u0, v0)-feasible contracts. In pure
strategies it is clear, for mixed strategies see the appendix.
The existence of a non-feasible finite static game motivates us to study repeated games. This
is also more realistic in some situations: when we marry, we play with the partner everyday.
5.5 Infinitely Repeated Games are Feasible
Consider a two-person finite game in mixed strategies, G = (X,Y, u, v), called the stage game.
Given a fixed T ∈ N, consider the T stages game GT with payoff functions γ
1
T (σ) :=
1
T
Eσ[∑T
t=1 u(xt)
]
, γ2T (σ) :=
1
T
Eσ
[∑T
t=1 v(yt)
]
, with σ := (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ being a strategy profile. Consider
the uniform game G∞ as the game obtained by taking T →∞ in GT .
Definition 5.4. Consider the set of feasible payoffs co(u, v) := Conv{(u(x, y), v(x, y)) ∈ R2 :
(x, y) ∈ X × Y }, in which Conv stands for the convex envelope. Define the punishment level
of players 1 and 2 respectively by, α := miny∈△(Y ) maxx∈△(X) u(x, y), β := minx∈△(X)maxy∈△(Y )
v(x, y). Then, the set of non-punished payoffs is defined as NP := {(u¯, v¯) ∈ R2 : u¯ ≥ α, v¯ ≥ β}.
Finally, consider the set of feasible and non-punished payoffs E := co(u, v) ∩NP .
Consider u0, v0 ∈ R outside options for player 1 and player 2 respectively. The set of acceptable
payoffs is defined as Eu0,v0 := co(u, v) ∩ {(u¯, v¯) ∈ R
2 : u¯ ≥ u0 and v¯ ≥ v0}.
Definition 5.5. A strategy profile σ = (σ1, σ2) is called a (u0, v0)-constrained uniform equilib-
rium of G∞ if:
(1) ∀ε> 0, σ is a (u0, v0)-ε-constrained equilibrium of any long enough finitely repeated game,
that is: ∃T0,∀T ≥ T0,∀(τ1, τ2) ∈ Σ :
(a) If γ1T (τ1, σ2)>γ
1
T (σ) + ε then γ
2
T (τ1, σ2) < v0,
(b) If γ2T (σ1, τ2)>γ
2
T (σ) + ε then γ
1
T (σ1, τ2) < u0, and
(2) [(γ1T (σ), γ
2
T (σ))]T has a limit γ(σ) in R
2 as T goes to infinity, with γ1(σ) ≥ u0, γ
2(σ) ≥ v0.
The set of constrained uniform equilibrium payoffs is denoted as Eceu0,v0 .
Definition 5.6. Game G∞ is feasible if whenever Eu0,v0 is non-empty, then E
ce
u0,v0
is non-empty.
Theorem 5.7. The class of uniform games is feasible.
By Folk theorem [14], the following proposition holds.
Proposition 5.1. Any payoff in E ∩Eu0,v0 can be achieved by a constrained uniform equilibrium.
14We want to thank Eilon Solan for having suggested this example.
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Proof Theorem 5.7. Suppose Eu0,v0 is non empty. We aim to show that E
ce
u0,v0
is non empty as
well. Recall the punishment levels α and β for players 1 and 2. The analysis is split in four cases.
Case 1. v0 ≥ β and u0 ≥ α. It holds that Eu0,v0 ⊆ E. Then, by proposition 5.1, E
ce
u0,v0
= Eu0,v0 .
Since Eu0,v0 is non empty, E
ce
u0,v0
is non empty as well.
Case 2. v0<β and u0<α. It holds that E ⊂ Eu0,v0 . Thus, E
ce
u0,v0
contains E (by proposition 5.1)
and so, it is non empty.
Case 3. v0<β and u0 ≥ α. If F := Eu0,v0 ∩ E is non empty, by proposition 5.1, all elements
of F are in Eceu0,v0 . Otherwise, consider (u
′, v′) defined by v′ := max{v : ∃u s.t. (u, v) ∈ Eu0,v0},
u′ ∈ {u : (u, v′) ∈ Eu0,v0}. As Eu0,v0 is a non empty closed set, (u
′, v′) indeed exists and it belongs
to Eu0,v0 . Consider the strategy profile σ
′ in which the players follow a pure plan which yields to
the payoff (u′, v′). If player 1 deviates, player 2 punishes him/her at the level α, and if player 2
deviates, player 1 ignores the deviation and continues to follow the pure plan. Player 1 cannot gain
more than ε by deviating. Indeed, if he/she does, player 2 punishes him/her by reducing her payoff
to α. Since (u′, v′) ∈ Eu0,v0 , it holds that u
′ ≥ u0 ≥ α and so this deviation is not profitable. For
player 2, suppose there exists T ∈ N and ε> 0 such that he/she can obtain a payoff v′′>v′ + ε
by deviating at stage T . Let u′′ be the average payoff of player 1 obtained at stage T after the
deviation of player 2. Since (u′′, v′′) is an average payoff of the T -stages game, it is feasible. It
cannot hold that u′′ ≥ u0, since it is in contradiction with the definition of v
′, as the payoff (u′′, v′′)
would be acceptable. Thus, u′′<u0. As a conclusion, σ
′ is a constrained equilibrium and then,
(u′, v′) ∈ Eceu0,v0 .
Case 4. v0 ≥ β and u0<α. Analogously to case 3.
Theorem 5.8. Consider that all games Gi,j , with (i, j) ∈M×W , are uniform games. Then, there
exists an oracle such that algorithm 2 converges.
Proof. Let pi be an externally stable matching profile, and consider (i, j) ∈ µ the couple that
modifies their strategy profile at iteration t. Let (ut0, v
t
0) be their outside options at iteration
t, and consider Ft := E ∩ Eut
0
,vt
0
. If Ft is non empty, there exists a (u
t
0, v
t
0)-feasible uniform
equilibrium for (i, j), so they keep playing this strategy profile forever. If Ft = ∅, without loss
of generality, assume that ut0 ≥ α and v
t
0<β. Consider the oracle used in the proof of theorem
5.7. Let (ut, vt) be the (ut0, v
t
0)-constrained Nash equilibrium chosen at iteration t by the oracle,
so vt := max{v : ∃u s.t. (u, v) ∈ Eut
0
,vt
0
}. If vt ≥ β, (ut, vt) ∈ E and then, Ft is non empty, a
contradiction. Thus, vt<β. Let r > t be the next iteration in which (i, j) modifies their strategy
profile. Let (ur0, v
r
0) be their new outside options and Fr = E ∩ Eur0,vr0 . If Fr is non empty, they
play a uniform equilibrium. Otherwise, since vr0 ≤ v
t ≤ β, in particular it holds that ur0 ≥ α
and vr0 <β. Let (u
r, vr) be the new constrained Nash equilibrium found by the oracle. Since
external stability implies that (ut, vt) ∈ Eur
0
,vr
0
, vr ≥ vt. In addition, as Fr is empty, v
r <β. Thus,
consider an infinite sequence of iterations in which couple (i, j) changes of strategy profiles. In
particular, at each iteration t, Ft = ∅ and therefore, j obtains a non-decreasing sequence of payoffs
(vt)t, bounded from above by β. Then, the sequence converges to a fixed payoff v, and therefore,
algorithm 2 converges.
5.6 Q-Concave Games and Connected Games
Consider a two-person game G = (X,Y, u, v), with X,Y compact and convex subsets of topological
spaces and u, v continuous and own-payoff q-concave functions. Given (u0, v0) outside options for
players 1 and 2 respectively, we obtain the following result.
Lemma 5.3. Let (x′, y′) be a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium of a q-concave game that is not
a Nash equilibrium. Then, either u(x′, y′) = u0 or v(x
′, y′) = v0.
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Proof. Let (x′, y′) be a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium that is not a Nash equilibrium. Then,
at least one of the two players has a profitable deviation. Without loss of generality, suppose
player 1 can deviate to x and increase his/her payoff. In particular, v(x, y′)<v0. Let t ∈ [0, 1] and
define xt := tx
′ + (1 − t)x. Since u(x, y′)>u(x′, y′), by the q-concavity of u, u(xt, y
′)>u(x′, y′)
for any 0< t< 1. Then, v(xt, y
′)<v0 for any 0< t< 1. As v(x
′, y′) ≥ v0, by continuity of v,
limt→1 v(xt, y
′) = v0 = v(x
′, y′). Therefore, player 2 is receiving exactly his/her outside option.
Analogously, if player 2 has a profitable deviation, then player 1 gets exactly u0.
We aim to prove that algorithm 2 converges for feasible q-concave games that are connected.
Definition 5.7. A two-person game G = (X,Y, u, v) is a Connected-Game if there exists a Nash
equilibrium (x∗, y∗) such that for any pair of outside options (u0, v0) with NE ∩CNE(u0, v0) = ∅,
there exists a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium (x0, y0), such that one of the following properties
holds,
1. u(x∗, y∗)<u0 ≤ u(x0, y0), v0 ≤ v(x0, y0)<v(x
∗, y∗) and player 2 has a profitable deviation,
2. v(x∗, y∗)<v0 ≤ v(x0, y0), u0 ≤ u(x0, y0)<u(x
∗, y∗) and player 1 has a profitable deviation.
Theorem 5.9. Consider a matching game in which all games Gi,j, for any i ∈ M , j ∈ W , are
feasible, q-concave, and connected. Then, algorithm 2 converges.
Proof. Let pi := (µ, x, y) be an externally stable matching profile, (i, j) be a couple in µ and t an
iteration in which they change of strategy profile. Let (u0, v0) be their outside options and (xi, yj)
their current strategy profile. If NE ∩ CNE(u0, v0) is non empty, i and j pick a (u0, v0)-feasible
Nash equilibrium and they keep playing it forever. If NE∩CNE(u0, v0) = ∅, as Gi,j is a connected
game, there exists a Nash equilibrium (x∗i , y
∗
j ) and a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium (x0, y0)
such that one of the following properties holds,
(1) u(x∗i , y
∗
j )<u0 ≤ u(x0, y0), v0 ≤ v(x0, y0)<v(x
∗
i , y
∗
j ) and j has a profitable deviation,
(2) v(x∗i , y
∗
j )<v0 ≤ v(x0, y0), u0 ≤ u(x0, y0)<u(x
∗
i , y
∗
j ) and i has a profitable deviation.
Without loss of generality, suppose it holds (1). As Gi,j is q-concave and j has a profitable deviation
from (x0, y0), player i gets exactly his/her outside option, so u(x0, y0) = u0. Let r be the next
iteration at which i and j change of strategy profile. Let (u1, v1) be their new outside options, and
suppose thatNE∩CNE(u1, v1) is empty. As pi is externally stable, it holds that u1 ≤ u(x0, y0) = u0
and v1 ≤ v(x0, y0). Since Gi,j is connected, there exists a (u1, v1)-constrained Nash equilibrium
(with respect to the same Nash equilibrium (x∗i , y
∗
j )) (x1, y1), such that either (1) or (2) holds.
However, as v1 ≤ v(x0, y0)<v(x
∗
i , y
∗
j ), necessarily it must hold (1). Therefore, the new constrained
Nash equilibrium satisfies, u(x∗i , y
∗
j )<u1 = u(x1, y1) and v1 ≤ v(x1, y1)<v(x
∗
i , y
∗
j ), where player i
gets his/her outside option since Gi,j is q-concave. By induction, consider a sequence of iterations
in which players i and j change of strategy profile. In particular, they never found a feasible
Nash equilibrium as they kept changing of strategy profile forever. Then, we obtain a sequence of
outside options (ut, vt)t such that for each pair, there exists a (ut, vt)-constrained Nash equilibrium
(xt, yt), satisfying (a) u(x
∗
i , y
∗
j )<ut = u(xt, vt), ∀t ∈ N, (b) vt ≤ v(xt, yt)<v(x
∗
i , y
∗
j ),∀t ∈ N,
(c) (ut)t = (u(xt, yt))t is decreasing. Therefore, the sequence (ut)t is convergent and, at the
limit, the couple plays the Nash equilibrium (x∗i , y
∗
j ). As (i, j) is an arbitrary couple, algorithm 2
converges.
The class of connected games is rich enough to include zero-sum games and infinitely re-
peated games. Indeed, consider a zero-sum game G = (X,Y, g) with value w and (u0, v0) player’s
outside options. If NE ∩ CNE(u0, v0) = ∅, the value of the game is unfeasible, thus either
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u0<v0<w, or w<u0<v0. If the first case holds, there exists a constrained Nash equilibrium
(x0, y0) such that g(x0, y0) = v0. Moreover, player 1 has a profitable deviation since he/she can
always force to play the value of the game. As conclusion, game G satisfies the second property
of a connected game. Analogously, if it holds w<u0<v0, game G satisfies the first property of a
connected game.
For infinitely repeated games, consider a two-person stage game G and player’s outside options
(u0, v0) such that E ∩Eu0,v0 = ∅. In particular, either α ≤ u0 and v0<β, or α>u0 and v0 ≥ β. If
the first case holds, consider the payoff vector (u, v) defined by the oracle in the proof of Theorem
5.7. Moreover, consider the respective strategy profile σ in which both players follow a pure plan
to the payoff (u, v), such that, if player 1 deviates, player 2 punishes him/her by reducing his/her
payoff to α, and if player 2 deviates, player 1 omits it. Note that σ is not a uniform equilibrium as
(u, v) is not a uniform equilibrium payoff. It holds that σ is a (u0, v0)-constrained Nash equilibrium
and satisfies the first property of a connected game, with (α, β) being the Nash equilibrium payoff.
Moreover, as σ is not a uniform equilibrium, at least one of the players must have a profitable
deviation. As player 1 cannot deviate and increase his/her payoff, player 2 must have a profitable
deviation. Analogously, if it holds α>u0 and v0 ≥ β, G satisfies the second property of connected
games.
Unlike zero-sum games, infinitely repeated games are not necessarily q-concave as players do
not get exactly their outside option when their partners have a profitable deviation. Moreover,
comparing the proofs of Theorem 5.8 and Theorem 5.9, it is observed that we do not establish the
same monotonicity over the outside options. In the first theorem, we increase the outside option
of the player whose punishment level is too high. In the second theorem, we reduce the outside
option of the player whose Nash equilibrium payoff is too low.
6 Extensions and conclusion
Our paper proposes a new model that mixes Nash incentives with Gale-Shapley pairwise stability.
We have proved that many existing models and results are particular cases that can be derived
from our external stability section. Our originality is concentrated on the internal stability section.
We introduced the new class of feasible games, which is a necessary condition for the existence of
externally and internally stable matching, we proved that this class is rich enough to include zero-
sum, strictly competitive, potential and infinitely repeated games and that our algorithm returns
an externally and internally stable matching for all those sub-classes. It remains open whether
the existence of externally and internally stable matching holds for all feasible compact continuous
games.
There are other models in the literature where preferences are endogenous. In the investment
and competitive matching model of No¨ldeke and Samuelson [22], agents first make investments and
then are matched into potentially productive partnerships. Hence, once an investment is made,
it cannot be changed or made dependent on the identity of the partner. In our case, investments
(interpreted as a strategy choice) are not fixed in advance, can be changed during the matching
process, and may depend on the identity of the partner. This suggest an interesting extension of our
model: in period 1, all players (men and women) choose independently their strategies (inducing a
strategy profile (x, y)). Then, given (x, y) in period 2, a stable matching is computed using some
algorithm (for example the best matching for men). Question: under which condition does this
game have a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium?
Bich and Morhaim (2017) [6] introduced a network game model in which each player decides
with whom to create a link and, simultaneously, which strategy to play. A link is formed between
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two agents only if both agree to form it. A player’s payoff function depends on the adjacency matrix
of links and on the profile of all player’s strategies. Using a Browder fixed point theorem, they
proved the existence of a mixed Nash pairwise equilibrium. In our model, only bipartite graphs
can be formed, our proof of existence is constructive (algorithmic), our stability notion is pure,
and is much stronger than their notion (in their case, when a new couple form, they cannot change
their actions, also when a player deviates in actions, he/she assumes that his/her deviation will
not break the stability of the couple). This raises several interesting research directions: How to
compute stable equilibria in their model? or, how to relax our stability notions to obtain existence
in a larger classes of games?
A possible application of our model may be the case of matching to share risk of Chiappori
and Reny [8]. In their model, men and women must form couples and, simultaneously, determine
a sharing rule for splitting their total income. As Shapley-Shubik and Gale-Demange, matching to
share risk may be mapped into a matching game in which players must agree in the sharing rule.
Their characterizations for the set of stable outcomes may give us insights for the structure of the
set of stable matching profiles.
There are other interesting research directions that one may want to explore. For example, one
also would like to study the complexity of finding a constrained Nash equilibrum in a bi-matrix game
(at least PPAD complete, but we believe it to be NP-complete, since it may not exist as Solan’s
example shows). It would also be of interest to have an algorithm which computes a 0-externally
stable matching. Observe that all known algorithms of matching with transfers in the literature (e.g.
Kelso-Crawford [18] and Gale-Demange-Sotomayor [11]) compute ε-stable matchings but never an
exact stable matching, since they discretize the price space.
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A Other notions of External Stability
Definition A.1. A matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) is unilateral externally stable if,
(1) For any i ∈M and j ∈W , ui(pi) ≥ ui and vj(pi) ≥ vj,
(2) There is no (i, j) ∈ M ×W , not matched by µ, and no (si, tj) ∈ Xi × Yj such that either
Ui,j(si, yi) > ui(pi) and Vi,j(si, yi) > vj(pi) or Ui,j(xi, ti) > ui(pi) and Vi,j(xi, ti) > vj(pi).
Being unilateral externally stable is indeed weaker than being pairwise stable, as any unilateral
externally blocking pair is an externally blocking pair as well. The last notion, weaker than the
two already defined, assumes that players cannot change actions if they want to move from one
partner to another.
Definition A.2. A matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) is weakly externally stable if,
(1) For any i ∈M and j ∈W , ui(pi) ≥ ui and vj(pi) ≥ vj,
(2) There is no (i, j) ∈M ×W not matched by µ such that Ui,j(xi, yi) > ui(pi) and Vi,j(xi, yi) >
vj(pi).
Remark A.1. A matching profile is weakly externally stable if after fixing the chosen actions,
the matching is pairwise stable in Gale-Shapley’s sense. Therefore, if actions are interpreted as
investments decided before players are matched, as in No¨ldeke-Samuelson’s setting [22], our unilat-
eral/weak external stability notions and their stability notion are related.
Consider that all couples play the same fixed game G = (X,Y,U, V ), as in section 3.
Theorem A.1. Consider a matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) in which all couples play the same Nash
equilibrium (x, y). Then, pi is unilateral externally stable and Nash stable.
The proof is direct as in the setting in which all couples play the same game and the same strat-
egy profile, if a matching profile is Nash stable, then, it is unilateral externally stable. Therefore,
if all couples play the same two-person game G with at least one Nash equilibrium, we obtain the
existence of matching profiles that are unilateral externally stable and Nash stable. Going even
further, since unileteral externally stable matchings are also weakly externally stable, we obtain
the existence of weak externally stable and Nash stable matchings.
This last combination was studied by Bich and Morhain [6] in 2017, in a more general framework.
In their article, agents can create links with all partners and they can choose actions. The payoff
function of an agent depends on the links created and the actions played by all the agents. Their
concept of Nash-pairwise stability corresponds in our model to the combination weak externally
and Nash stability.
B Matching with Contracts seen as a Matching Game
Hatfield and Milgrom [17] defined a one-to-many assignation problem between doctors and hospital
in which, beside being paired, agents define a bilateral contract, from a finite set of contracts X.
In this section we prove that a one-to-one matching with contracts setting can be mapped into
a matching game, and viceversa. Due to this, external stability and Hatfield-Milgrom’s stability
coincide. Then, as for matching with transfers models, our notion of internal stability refines their
model in different directions, depending on the way the two-person games are defined. For the sake
of simplicity, we use the terminology of stable marriage.
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Consider two finite set of agentsM andW , men and women, and a finite set of bilateral contracts
X. A contract x ∈ X relates to only one man with only one woman. Agents have preferences over
the set of contracts, so they will pick the contract they prefer the most. Besides, each agent has
the option of being unmatched, so a contract x is never accepted by an agent k ∈M ∪W , if x<d ∅,
with ∅ the called empty contract. As contracts are bilateral, each x ∈ X is related to one man
xM ∈M and one woman xW ∈W , and they are the only ones that can trade it.
Consider a matching with contracts setting (M,W,X) as explained above. For every potential
couple (i, j) ∈M ×W , consider the strategic game G = (X,X, ui,j , vi,j), in which both players can
choose any contract fromX, and their payoff functions are given by, ui,j(x, y) = vi,j(x, y) = αi,j > 0,
if x = y and xM = i, xW = j, and ui,j(x, y) = vi,j(x, y) = βi,j < 0, otherwise. Constants α and β
are chosen such that, for any agent k, if h>k h
′ then αk,h′ >αk,h′, and β is lower than any constant
α. Note that the constant can be chosen like that as X is finite. The matching with contracts
instance (M,W,X) is mapped into a strategic matching game in which agents must form couples
and each partner chooses a contract. If a couple does not agree on the contract, or they agree on a
contract but this one is not related to them, they achieve a low payoff in comparison with agreeing
on any contract in X that relates them. Since agents can be unmatched, we consider the empty
players i0, j0, such that any player can match with them and they play a trivial game with only
one possible strategy, the empty contract ∅. A matching profile will be a triple pi = (µ, x, y) with
µ a matching between agents, and x, y contract profiles containing the choice of each player. A
matching profile pi will be externally stable if, (1) nobody prefers to leave the couple and become
single and, (2) no pair of agents, not matched between them, have a bilateral contract x ∈ X that
relates to both of them, and that both strictly prefer over the ones in pi. It is not difficult to see
that external stability is equivalent to the stable allocations defined by Hatfield and Milgrom, in a
one-to-one setting.
Conversely, given a matching game in which any potential couple (i, j) ∈M×W is endowed with
a finite strategic game Gi,j = (Xi, Yj , Ui,j, Vi,j), consider the set of contracts Z :=
⋃
(i,j)∈M×W Zi,j,
where Zi,j := Xi × Yj. Besides, consider that agent’s IRPs are given by the empty contract ∅.
Then, the matching game is mapped into a matching with contracts setting, where preferences
orders are given by player’s payoff functions. Once again, the two notions of stable allocation and
external stability coincides. This allows to prove existence of stable allocation for Hatfield and
Milgrom’s model. Moreover, our notion of internal stability refines their solution depending on
how the strategic games are defined.
C Proofs
C.1 Propose-dispose Algorithm
Proof Proposition 4.1. Since i proposed to j, there exists a contract (x, y) such that the triple
(x, y, j) is solution to (Pi(v)). Therefore, the triple (x, y, vj+ε) is a feasible solution to the problem
(Pmaxi,j (u
2
i )), thus, λ ≥ vj + ε.
Proof Proposition 4.2. Let i (proposer) and i′ (current partner) be two men competing for j. Let
(x∗, y∗) be the optimal contract that i computed when solved (Pi(v)) just before the proposition.
Suppose i′ is automatically replaced. Then, (x∗, y∗) is solution of (P newi,j (λi′)). Let v
new
j :=
Vi,j(x
∗, y∗) be j’s payoff with this contract. It holds that vnewj ≥ vj + ε since (x
∗, y∗) is a feasible
point of (P newi,j (λi′)). If u
2
i is the best payoff that i can get with his second most preferred woman,
it holds Ui,j(x
∗, y∗) ≥ u2i , as (x
∗, y∗, j) is the solution to (Pi(v)). Therefore, the trio (v
new
j , x
∗, y∗)
is a feasible solution of (Pmaxi,j (u
2
i )) and the result is concluded.
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Suppose i′ is not automatically replaced. Without loss of generality, suppose i wins. Let
(λi, xˆ, yˆ) be the solution of (P
max
i,j (u
2
i )). Then, the pair (xˆ, yˆ) is a feasible solution of (P
new
i,j (λi′)),
as Vi,j(xˆ, yˆ) = λi>λi′ . Consider any contract (x
′, y′) such that Vi,j(x
′, y′)>Vi,j(xˆ, yˆ). If (x
′, y′)
satisfies Ui,j(x
′, y′) ≥ u2i , we obtain a contradiction with the fact that (λi, xˆ, yˆ) is the solution of
(Pmaxi,j (u
2
i )). Therefore, the solution (x, y) of (P
new
i,j (λi′)) satisfies Vi,j(x, y) ≤ Vi,j(xˆ, yˆ) = λi.
Proof Theorem 4.3. Consider ε> 0. Let piε := (µε, xε, yε) be the output of algorithm 1. By theorem
4.2, piε is a ε-externally stable matching profile. Consider a sequence of these profiles (piε)ε with
ε going to 0, and a subsequence (piεk)k such that (xεk , yεk)k converges to a fixed contract (x, y),
which exists as the strategy sets are compact.
Since there are a finite number of possible matchings, consider a subsubsequence (piεkl )l such
that µεkl = µ,∀l ∈ N, with µ a fixed matching. Since (xkl , ykl)→ (x, y) when l→∞, the sequence
pikl converges to pi := (µ, x, y), with µ a complete matching and (x, y) a strategy profile. Moreover,
as εkl goes to 0, as for each l the matching profile pikl is εkl-externally stable, as the payoff functions
are continuous, and as, the definition of external stability only includes inequalities, pi is externally
stable.
C.2 Lattice Structure
Proof Lemma 4.2. Suppose there exists an iteration t ≥ 1 in which the proposer i cannot offer
to wi a higher payoff that the one she currently has, meaning that for any (x, y) ∈ Xi × Ywi ,
Vi,wi(x, y)<V
t
wi
+ ε. In particular, wi must be matched with someone, as her current payoff is
not −∞. Let k ∈ M be wi’s partner at time t. Since k is matched with wi, in particular he is
not matched with his best stable woman wk. Let r < t be the iteration when k proposed to wi.
Note that he did it either because he achieved a higher payoff than with wk, or because she had a
payoff which was too high at the moment, so k could not offer her a better contract. If the first
property holds, there exists a contract (x′, y′) ∈ Xk × Ywi such that Uk,wi(x
′, y′)>Uk,wk(piM ) + ε
(by (∗∗)ε). Thus, any proposition made to wi between iterations r and t was won by k, meaning
that wi continued being his best option (in particular better than wk), and it increased the payoff
of wi. We arrive to a contradiction since, if (x
′′, y′′) is the strategy profile played by k and wi at
iteration t, then (k,wi) is a ε-blocking pair of piM with respect to (x
′′, y′′). Indeed, k gets a payoff
ε higher than with wk by matching with wi and playing (x
′′, y′′), and for any (x, y) ∈ Xi × Ywi ,
Vi,wi(x, y)<Vk,wi(x
′′, y′′)+ε. Therefore, it must hold that k could not have proposed to wk at time
r since she was matched with someone else, and was getting a too high payoff. Inductively, we
obtain a sequence of man {i1, ..., im} (ordered chronologically) such that none of them was able to
propose to his best stable woman, because they had a too highe payoff at the moment. Consider
the first of them, i1, and let k be the partner of wi1 when i1 proposed. Then, k proposed to wi1
and not to wk because he got a better payoff with her than with wk, who was single at that time,
as before i1 all men proposed to their best stable woman. As before, this contradicts the ε-external
stability of piM , as (k,wi1) would block it.
C.2.1 Strictly Competitive Games
The minimum of two matchings is well defined for strictly competitive games obtained as in-
creasing affine transformation of zero-sum games. Given two matching profile pi = (µ, x, y) and
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pi = (µ, x′, y′), consider the minimum matching µ∧ defined by,
µ∧i := argmin{Ui,µi(xi, yµi);Ui,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)},∀i ∈M
:= argmin{ϕ−1(gi,µi(xi, yµi));ϕ
−1(gi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
))},∀i ∈M
:= ϕ−1(argmin{gi,µi(xi, yµi)); (gi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′
i
))}),∀i ∈M
:= ϕ−1(argmin{−φ(Vi,µi(xi, yµi));−φ(Vi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)})),∀i ∈M
:= ϕ−1(argmax{φ(Vi,µi(xi, yµi));φ(Vi,µ′i (x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
))}),∀i ∈M
:= ϕ−1 ◦ φ(argmax{Vi,µi(xi, yµi);Vi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)}),∀i ∈M
:= argmax{Vi,µi(xi, yµi);Vi,µ′i(x
′
i, y
′
µ′i
)},∀i ∈M
:= ν∨i ,∀i ∈M
As ν∨ is always well defined, µ∧ is indeed, a proper matching. Moreover, pi∨ remains externally
stable and it holds the duality between µ∨ and µ∧.
C.3 Extensive form games with perfect information
Extensive form games with perfect information are also feasible games, as proved in this section.
Consider a finite set of players I and a set P of nodes of a tree. For each p ∈ P , we define its set of
successor nodes in the tree by S(p). For each i ∈ I we consider a set P i of nodes of the tree where
i has to play. A strategy σi for player i is an application on P i which associates to each position
p ∈ P i a successor node in S(p). The set of terminal nodes or results is denoted by R, and the
payoff of player i is given by ui(r) with r ∈ R.
Consider outside options ui0 ∈ R for the all players i ∈ I. For player i we consider the set of
terminal nodes Ri0 such that his/her payoff is at least his/her outside option. We call the game
G admissible if there exists at least one strategy σ such that F [σ], the final node reached by σ,
belongs to
⋂
i∈I R
i
0, so players can obtain at least their outside options. It is straightforward to
prove (by induction on the length) that the game is admissible if and only if
⋂
i∈I R
i
0 is non empty.
Definition C.1. Let G be an admissible game and let σ = (σi)i∈I be a strategy such that F [σ] ∈⋂
i∈I R
i
0. σ is a constrained equilibrium if for any i ∈ I and for any strategy τ
i of player i,
if ui(F [τ i, σ−i])>ui(F [σ]) then F [τ i, σ−i] /∈
⋂
i∈I R
i
0, that is, every time a player has a profitable
deviation from σ, there is another player for whom the terminal node is not feasible.
A strategy profile σ naturally induces a strategy in the subgames G[p], where p is a node of the
tree and G[p] the game starting from p. As with subgame-perfect equilibrium, we can define the
notion of constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Definition C.2. A strategy profile σ is a constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium if for each
position p such that G[p] is admissible, the continuation strategy σ[p] induced by σ is a constrained
equilibrium of G[p].
Definition C.3. A finite perfect information game G is called feasible if any time that there
exists a strategy profile σ such that F [σ] ∈
⋂
i∈I R
i
0, then there exists τ a constrained subgame-
perfect equilibrium such that F [τ ] ∈
⋂
i∈I R
i
0.
Theorem C.1. Every finite perfect information game is feasible.
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Proof. We make the proof by forward induction over the length n of the game. Let i be the
player who plays at the first node r, the root of the tree. For n = 1, note that G corresponds to
a game where only i plays and then the outputs are announced. Player i will choose the action
that maximizes his/her payoff subject to choose an ending node in ∩i∈IR
i
0, obtaining a strategy
σ in which nobody can deviate without violating the constraint. Therefore, σ is a constrained
equilibrium which is subgame perfect because the game has no subgame.
Suppose that any perfect information game of length n is feasible, and let G be a game of length
n+ 1. Suppose G is admissible, so there exists a path from the root to a terminal node that gives
all players a payoff greater than or equal to their outside options. We aim to prove that G has a
constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Let S(r) be the set of all possible nodes that i can choose when he/she plays for the first time,
that is, S(r) is the set of successors of the root of the tree. Since G is admissible, there is at least
one node p ∈ S(r) such that G[p] is also admissible. Let S′ ⊆ S(r) be the set of all nodes p in S(r)
such that G[p] is admissible. By induction, all subgames G[p] with p ∈ S′ are feasible, so for each
of them there exists σ′p a constrained subgame perfect equilibrium.
Consider the strategies σp := (p, σ
′
p) in which player i chooses a node p ∈ S
′ in his/her first turn
and then, in the subgame G[p], players follow the constrained equilibrium σ′p. From all strategies
σp with p ∈ S
′, consider the one that maximizes i’s payoff, called σp∗. We claim that σp∗ is a
constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium of game G. Indeed, for p∗ the induced strategy σp∗[p
∗]
coincides with σ′p∗ so it corresponds to a constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium. Moreover, since
i chose the best node p ∈ S′ for his/her, he/she has not incentive to deviate to any other node in
S′. Therefore, the strategy σp∗ is a constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium, since choosing any
other node in S(r) \ S′ yields to a non admissible subgame.
We also present an alternative proof by backward induction in which we construct a constrained
subgame-perfect equilibrium or we prove that the tree is not admissible. Consider the longest path
from the root r to some terminal node t in R. Note that there is a unique path from r to t since
the tree is an acyclic graph. Let it be the last player to play in this path and consider the set Rit
of all the terminal nodes that it can choose. The set is non empty since t ∈ Rit . Next, consider the
set of all nodes in Rit that belong to
⋂
i∈I R
i
0. If the intersection
⋂
i∈I R
i
0∩Rit is non empty, player
it can choose a final node that gives all players at least their outside option. If this is the case,
it picks the one that maximizes his/her payoff. On the other hand, if the intersection if empty,
anyway player it picks a node maximizing his/her own payoff. Note that, in the first case player it
has no incentive to deviate to any other node in
⋂
i∈I R
i
0, so if he/she has a profitable deviation,
there will be a player who receives less than his/her outside option. In the second case, player it is
playing in a non admissible game.
Once it has chosen her node, we erase all the nodes of Rit from the tree and we replace the node
in which it had to play by the terminal node in which all players receive the payoff related to the
choice of it. Once this done, we come back to the first step of finding the longest path from the
root to some terminal node. We iterate until reducing the tree to just the root r.
Since each time a player has to decide the final node to reach in the tree, either he/she chooses
a constrained equilibrium or a non admissible game, the final result of this procedure leads to
either finding a constrained subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game G, or proving that G is a non
admissible game, so we conclude that G is feasible.
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D A non feasible game
Consider the following matrix game G
L M R
T 2,1 -10,-10 3,0
M 3,0 2,1 -10,-10
B -10,-10 3,0 2,1
Game G has only one Nash equilibrium, in mixed strategies, in which agents play the three
strategies with the same probability, getting a payoff of −5/3 and −3 respectively. Consider outside
options u0, v0 equal to 0 and let Z1,2 be the set of feasible contracts for players 1 and 2. Note that
Z1,2 is non empty since (M,M) ∈ Z1,2. We claim that there are no constrained equilibria in Z1,2. To
prove this, consider an acceptable and feasible payoff (u′, v′). Let (x, y) = ((x1, x2, x3), (y1, y2, y3))
be a mixed strategy profile that achieves the payoff (u′, v′), in which each coordinate corresponds
to playing Top, Medium and Bottom respectively for player 1, and Left, Medium and Right for
player 2. Note that if any of the players is playing a pure strategy, the other player can improve
his/her payoff by an unilateral deviation, respecting the outside option of the first player. For
example, if player 1 is playing x = (1, 0, 0), that is, he/she is playing Top, player 2 can deviate
to play Left with probability 1, increasing his/her payoff and still giving player 1 at least his/her
outside option. In the same way, if player 2 plays Left, player 1 can deviate to play Medium. So
no pure strategy is a constrained equilibrium. Going even further, if a player does not play the
three actions with positive probability, the other can always deviate and increase his/her payoff.
For example, if player 1 plays (x1, x2, 0), player 2 can deviate and play Left with probability 1 if
x1 is large enough, or a mixed strategy mixing only Left and Medium, if x2 is large enough. In
any of the two cases, players converge to play pure strategies, deviating all the time without ever
reaching a constrained Nash equilibrium.
Consider that both players play all strategies with a positive probability. Note that none of
them will play the three actions with equal probability, since the Nash equilibrium does not belong
to Z1,2. Without loss of generality, let us assume that x1> 1/3 ≥ x2. Recalling that x3 = 1−x1−x2
and y3 = 1− y1 − y2, the expected payoff of player 2 is given by,
v′ = v(x, y) = y1(12x1 + 21x2 − 11) + y2(−9x1 + 12x2 − 1) + (1− x1 − 11x2)
It holds that x1, x2, y1, y2 are positive and x1 + x2< 1, y1 + y2< 1, since players have full support.
Then, −9x1 + 12x2 − 1< 0, so player 2 can deviate and increase his/her payoff by decreasing y2.
Consider now the payoff of player 1,
u′ = u(x, y) = y1(11x1 + 25x2 − 12) + y2(−14x1 + 11x2 + 1) + (x1 − 12x2 + 2)
It holds −14x1+11x2+1< 0, so player 1 increases his/her payoff if y2 decreases. Therefore, player
2 has a profitable deviation that still guarantees to player 1 his/her outside option. Intuitively,
since player 1 is more likely to play Top, it makes sense that both players improve their payoff
if player 2 decreases the probability of playing Medium, so they avoid to get −10 as payoff. We
conclude that (u′, v′) is not the payoff of a constrained equilibrium payoff, and therefore, the game
G is not feasible.
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